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Chapter One: Introduction 
 The fall of the New Order and the rapid decentralization that Indonesia underwent 
subsequently greatly changed the landscape of Indonesian politics. For one, communities 
suddenly had much more opportunity to participate in local governance. The effects of 
this were broad-sweeping, and out of these changes grew a variety of social and political 
movements, which, after the fall of Suharto’s dictatorship in 1998, became able to 
mobilize and advocate more openly. Specifically, ethnic politics then were able to 
participate in discourse safely; Suharto’s dictatorial regime had for decades denied the 
existence of all indigenous groups in Indonesia, and its end thus signaled a promising 
new political climate for indigenous communities. This transformation was particularly 
meaningful for the Dayaks, an indigenous group of Kalimantan, the Indonesian part of 
Borneo, who in recent years have adopted an increased role in political participation. 
Subsequently, ethnic politics in Kalimantan in the 21st century have been central to 
framing the ways in which local Dayak communities interact with greater Indonesian 
institutions.  
Alongside this rapid decentralization, since the fall of Suharto, the Indonesian 
government has grappled with issues of sustainable development. The government has 
had to balance, on one hand, international pressures to reduce carbon emissions and 
protect biodiversity, and on the other, the interests of large, natural resource-intensive 
industries. One of the foremost of these issues is related to customary land rights. Until 
recently, all forests in Indonesia had been under state ownership, which allowed the state 
to sell concessions, such as for oil palm plantations, at will (Butt 2014, 59). However, a 
2013 Constitutional Court ruling reclassified customary forests as separate from state-
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owned forests, and now, with growing Dayak mobilization and activism, conflicts over 
land tenure have become increasingly common (Warassih and Sulaiman 2017).  
Historically, the Dayaks have been particularly reliant on forests for their 
livelihoods, using, typically, a combination of swidden farming and diversification of 
forest products. These sorts of livelihoods, however, have been threatened by a changing 
natural environment, which constricts the livelihood options of Dayak communities. 
Dayak identity, the topic of Chapter 2, is central to issues of land tenure because the law 
now requires communities to prove that they have maintained their indigenous 
institutions in order to substantiate customary land claims. Thus, the maintenance of 
Dayak forest management systems, including swidden farming, is important. Such Dayak 
forestry practices will be the focus of Chapter 3. The above threats to Dayak livelihoods 
often have stemmed from government efforts portrayed as promotions of sustainable 
practices. Popular perceptions that swidden agriculture is damaging, and portrayals of the 
Dayak people as backward and uneducated, have legitimized government land-grabbing, 
regardless of the falsehood of these beliefs (McWilliam 2006). Overlapping regulations 
and claims to tenure complicate these issues further, and will be discussed in Chapter 4.  
On one hand, the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia clarifies in Article 33 (3) that the 
government holds the absolute rights to control land, water, and resources. Thus, the 
Indonesian state, and more specifically the Ministry of Environment and Forestry, has the 
ultimate authority over the management of forest resources. On the other hand, series of 
recent legal rulings have created opportunities for the Dayaks and other indigenous 
groups by recognizing customary land rights for the first time. For example, after years of 
repeated incarcerations of protestors who have attempted to organize against corporate 
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land grabs, articles of the 2004 Plantation Act were dropped after being ruled 
unconstitutional for discrimination against indigenous people (Butt 2014). Furthermore, a 
later ruling from the Indonesian Constitutional Court in 2013 promised to grant 
ownership of state land to back to indigenous groups holding customary rights with some 
conditions (Ibid.). Prior to this ruling, communities of indigenous people, including the 
Dayaks, had been forcibly removed from their traditional lands for economic activities 
like oil palm plantations or mining, or had little control over the management of such 
land.  
 While rulings like these are promising, local activists have claimed that in 
actuality, little has been done to implement them (Nugroho 2019). As mentioned above, 
the Indonesian state has added a stipulation that, in order for groups to qualify as 
indigenous, they must be able to prove that they have maintained their adat, or customary 
laws and institutions (Asien et al. 2017).  As a result, the ways in which indigeneity has 
been defined by the Indonesian state have required that in order to receive customary land 
rights, they must prove that their own institutions have continued to exist in a more or 
less static state over decades (Lounela 2017, 133). Thus, one challenge for Dayaks in 
working around issues of land tenure has been that they must demonstrate that they in 
fact have maintained these institutions. However, this is a rather vague idea in practice, 
and there is not yet an established procedure for gaining government recognition.  
Regardless, these do signal a shift in discourse; Indonesia’s official view on 
indigeneity historically has been that all Indonesians are ‘indigenous’, or, in effect, that 
no one is. Because of this, before the fall of the New Order, it was nearly impossible to 
bring the issue of customary land claims to the national political agenda. With much 
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lobbying from activists, however, the state now recognizes the masyarakat adat, or 
indigenous communities (Li 2001). Therefore, much more opportunity exists now for 
indigenous advocacy, and, as will be discussed later, Dayak identity constructions have 
been placed at the forefront of many of these efforts. In part, this has been used as a 
means to demonstrate the maintenance of indigenous institutions.  
More recently, however, some legislative barriers have existed.  For one, a new 
law, the Recognition and Protection of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act (PPHMHA) 
was drafted in 2015, but was stalled in Parliament in 2016 (Rogers 2016). The proposed 
legislation was opposed strongly by the Indonesian Ministry of Forestry, which 
historically has been quite controversial. At the time, the Ministry had been under 
investigation by the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK), in part over a case 
where high-ranking officials were involved in the illegal distribution of permits with 
support from the Ministry of Forestry itself (Oesterheld 2016). While the government has 
indeed made efforts to reduce corruption and increase transparency, mistrust of the 
government has continued to be a persistent issue for local communities.  
Nevertheless, the primary NGO pushing for the passage of the PPHMHA is the 
Alliance of Indigenous People of the Archipelago (AMAN), which has played a great 
role in lobbying for the recognition of the rights of indigenous people—including the 
Dayaks (AMAN n.d.).  Regardless, because of how the Indonesian state has defined 
indigeneity, Dayak identity constructions have become a focal point for activists as a 
means to encourage a rather diverse set of communities to mobilize as a unified group. 
This is one reason why the use of Dayak cultural symbols and ethnic pride have risen in 
recent years (Sillander and Alexander 2016, 99).  
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This has been a significant turn from a long history of Dayak marginalization, 
dating back to Dutch colonization. The term “Dayak”, even, was originally imposed 
externally, by Bornean Malays (Tanasaldy 2012) and encompasses quite a large body of 
people; there are by some estimates around 450 ethnolinguistic Dayak groups who live 
throughout Borneo (Minority Rights Group International 1997), although many of them 
share a number of common cultural practices both in language and in customary laws. 
Borneo itself is shared by three countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei. Furthermore, 
the Indonesian part of Borneo is divided into the provinces of West Kalimantan, Central 
Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, and South Kalimantan. Because of this diversity, this 
thesis will focus in particular on the Dayaks of West Kalimantan.  
West Kalimantan was chosen, first, because it still has significant forest cover, a 
large indigenous population, and some community-based forest management programs 
have already been established there. Second, West Kalimantan’s capital, Pontianak, has 
been the site of much activist activity, and, as the most populous city in Kalimantan 
generally, it has been a historical center for Dayak politics. It should be noted, however, 
that the Dayaks are a small minority within the population of Pontianak; the majority of 
Dayaks live in rural areas outside of the city.   
This thesis will examine Dayak identity constructions and how they have been 
and are currently being used to assert customary land rights in forested areas of West 
Kalimantan. Involved in this will be a study of how the Dayaks have used these 
constructions to fit definitions of indigeneity as prescribed by the Indonesian state, as 
well as how Dayak activists are employing these constructions to demonstrate that their 
indigenous institutions indeed have been maintained. In addition, current forestry policy 
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and government programs will be studied, as well as how these may be improved to 
better fit the needs of indigenous communities. A few questions will be raised: What 
aspects of identity must be maintained in order to be sufficient to claim customary land 
rights under Indonesian law? How has recent Dayak mobilization fed into a resurgence in 
Dayak identity and pride, and vice versa? What opportunities does this hold for 
conservation and sustainable development?   
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Chapter Two: Dayak identity 
 In Indonesia, Dayak identity has suffered from the imposition of a variety of 
stereotypes strengthened by decades of popular discourse. On one hand, the Dayaks often 
are seen as traditional and close to nature, which might legitimize their historical 
knowledge of sustainable practices. One the other, a perception also exists of the Dayaks 
as violent and primitive, which has justified their past exclusion even further. For the 
most part, these stereotypes often have been quite damaging, as they have served as a 
basis for the marginalization of Dayak communities for centuries (Henley and Davidson 
2013).  
Yet in more recent years, West Kalimantan has witnessed a reconstruction of 
Dayak identity. Dayak communities have appropriated these once-harmful images as a 
means for mobilization and as a strategy to address a variety of political, economic, and 
environmental challenges. This has contributed to the development of a more united 
Dayak community that has been strengthened through a common struggle (Sillander and 
Alexander 2016). This chapter will examine Dayak identity constructions and how these 
have fed into popular perceptions of the Dayaks through history, and further how Dayak 
activists in more recent years have increasingly employed Dayak identity symbols, and 
with what effect.  
An introduction to Dayak culture 
   When examining Dayak identity constructions, it is useful to first discuss Dayak 
culture. As mentioned previously, the term Dayak has been applied to a diverse range of 
groups across Borneo. There are seven main Dayak groups, classified by their larger 
respective linguistic groups: Iban (Sea Dayak), Bidayuh (Land Dayak), Melanau, 
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Kelabit, Kayan, Kenyah, and Penan. Within these larger groups, there are dozens of 
smaller ones. Each group usually has its own language as well, with varying degrees of 
mutual intelligibility. In addition to linguistic differences, Dayak groups may also differ 
in physical appearance. However, common physical traits among the Dayaks tend to be 
similar among the mountain peoples of Southeast Asia, ranging as far as Thailand, 
Vietnam, and Laos. Cultural practices from Java China, India, and Malaysia also have 
had influence (Rubenstein 1985). 
Regardless, some common cultural practices exist, which will be a point of focus 
for this thesis. The idea that these cultural practices are common is emphasized because 
it has been of key significance for Dayak activists and politicians to unite a diverse 
range of peoples, all of whom have been labeled Dayak. The use of common symbols is 
then important for encouraging the collective mobilization of these groups as a larger 
unit. Whether or not this has actually been the case will be an important question for this 
thesis, and will be explored throughout.  
Another key aspect of Dayak culture is that among different Dayak groups 
varying levels of egalitarianism once existed (Jessup and Vayda 1988). The Iban (Sea 
Dayaks), for example, were more or less classless. Between Dayak groups, however, 
there was some social stratification. For example, the nomadic Penans in Sarawak had no 
social classes, yet were seen as inferior by nearby groups with whom they traded forest 
products. The Kayans and Kenyahs by contrast were quite hierarchical (Ibid.). These 
Dayak groups once even owned slaves. Power in Kayan and Kenyah communities was 
extremely concentrated in the hands of village chiefs (maren), who often commanded 
large groups of slaves, made up of individuals captured in battles with rivals (Rubenstein 
		
9	
9	
1985). The practice of slavery persisted among the Dayaks until 1928, after which the 
government devised a system whereby Dayaks could be fined for slave ownership. This 
was then incorporated into Dayak customary law, which was enforced by the government 
court (Ibid.).  
 The Dayaks also were formerly headhunters, which is one cultural practice that 
has very likely contributed to some of the persisting stereotypes of the Dayaks as violent 
and backward. This will be expanded upon later in the chapter because of its relevance to 
the ways in which more recent violent conflicts between the Dayaks and the Madurese 
were framed by the media. However, it is important to note that these practices were, in 
actuality, deeply ceremonial. For example, rituals like the kenyalan in Iban, a celebration 
of bravery, required fresh human heads. Thus, the more successful Dayak headhunters 
often received a certain degree of prestige, as they were seen as contributing to 
prosperity-invoking rituals of the community through the supply of heads (Jessup and 
Vayda 1988). These heads were usually taken from members of neighboring tribes. 
Headhunting as a practice declined significantly towards the end of the 19th century 
(Oesterheld 2016).   
Cultural practices among the Dayaks generally share at least one common, 
fundamental factor: they are governed by adat, or customary law. Because the 
Indonesian government has required that indigenous groups demonstrate that they have 
maintained their adat institutions to claim customary land ownership, the concept of 
adat will be discussed often in this thesis. Larry Kenneth Thomson (2000) describes 
adat as “bodies of social and cultural norms, laws, ceremonies, and rituals… founded 
on, and intertwined with animistic beliefs” (7). Thus, adat plays a fundamental role in 
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Dayak society, and permeates virtually every aspect of community life. For example, it 
provides guidance for decisions about when to harvest, when to plant, and for 
regulations regarding health and relationships among community members (Thomson 
2000, 57). It relies on a worldview that contains both visible and invisible (or spiritual) 
parts. Although most Dayaks by now have converted to Christianity or Islam, many 
Dayaks still hold expectations that their new religions will guide their lives in the same 
ways that their older, more animist beliefs had (Ibid.). However, Islam and Christianity 
often do not provide the same breadth of behavioral guidance (Hohne et al. 2018). So, 
where their new religions have provided inadequate guidance, adat beliefs often still fill 
in the gaps; in fact, in times of crisis, many Dayaks will fall back upon their animist 
beliefs (Thomson 2000, 188). 
Dayak systems of forest management are also important, as their knowledge of 
traditional, sustainable practices has the potential to legitimize their claims to forest 
tenure. And, adat law, which governs the extraction of resources from common land, 
has shaped these systems. Thus, the relationship between adat law and conservation is 
necessarily quite close. There is a clear, farsighted incentive for users to maintain their 
shared resources over time, as presumably they will continue to rely on those resources 
for the foreseeable future. This is especially true for Dayak communities, which have 
lived off of forested land for centuries. A culture surrounding shared resources has 
developed slowly during that time, and has been so pervasive that the sharing of 
community resources is now deeply engrained into adat law (Mulyoutami, Rismawan, 
and Joshi 2009).   
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However, historically, the threat of the “tragedy of the commons” has existed. 
Some academics feared that individuals, acting in their own self-interest and ignoring 
the costs imposed upon others, would exploit common resources, until those resources 
were destroyed from overuse (Hardin 1968).  This has fed into a belief that in order to 
adequately maintain common resources, an authority that governs and restricts them is 
necessary. 
Yet, a shift in thought, and later, in practice, has demonstrated that this is often 
not the case. More recent research has shown that while the “tragedy of the commons” is 
a real threat, community-based management programs of common pool resources may 
be some of the most effective and sustainable (Ostrom et al. 1999).  This is probably true 
in the case of the Dayaks. When Dayak households control resources, these are 
generally managed with sustainability and conservation in mind (Mulyoutami, 
Rismawan, and Joshi 2009). Yet, many community-based forest management programs 
in Indonesia, as they exist now, remain quite weak. They often do not allocate 
ownership to local communities, they limit local communities’ bargaining power, and 
because the existing judicial system is lacking, it is unable to monitor fair agreements 
(Liu, Faure, & Mascini 2018, 39). This again emphasizes the importance of establishing 
fairer land user rights, which would increase the effectiveness of community-based 
forest management programs.  
Nonetheless, traditional Dayak systems of forest management are quite 
sophisticated. As forest dwellers, the Dayaks employ a diverse variety of land-use 
systems, including shared plots (bengkar), and mixed fruit orchards. The success and 
management of these rely on a rich understanding of forest systems and how to employ 
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these in order to extract resources while minimizing negative impact (Mulyoutami, 
Rismawan, and Joshi 2009). The two primary Dayak systems of forest management are 
community forest reserves and swidden agriculture. Most Dayak villages own 
community forest reserves, which are used primarily for hunting and extraction of 
timber, herbs, and wild fruits and vegetables. Large-scale logging is generally 
disallowed. Swidden agriculture is the main method by which rice is cultivated, although 
it is also used for vegetables, banana, and cassava, among other crops. Swidden is often 
closely associated with cultural rituals, particularly in times of harvest. Usually, swidden 
is used for household consumption, and not for market (Ibid, 2057). Again, these 
traditional, sustainable practices, governed by adat law, play a crucial role in 
substantiating Dayak claims to forest user rights.  
The complex process of identity formation 
One important element of understanding the historical development of Dayak 
identity constructions has been the existence of delineated outgroups. It is difficult to tell 
precisely what elements become significant in distinguishing between “us” and “them”, 
or between an “inside” or an “outside”, but it is quite clear, for the Dayaks, that the 
process of forming these groups has been deeply impacted by both cultural and social 
factors. Contact between the Dayaks and outsiders has helped define what these 
outgroups are, and thus they likely include a diverse, evolving range of actors, ranging 
from the Malay Sultanate in the early 20th Century, the Dutch colonizers, and eventually 
the modern Indonesian state. To elaborate, these outgroups necessarily give the term 
‘Dayak’ meaning, which is shaped through existing Dayak marginality and resistance. 
Since the fall of Suharto, Dayak identity has experienced a reconstruction and resurgence, 
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as opportunity to do so has opened up under decentralization and the establishment of 
liberal democracy in Indonesia (Duile 2017). 
Psychological theories of identity are useful in examining how identity might be 
formed. One facet of this has been that many scholars agree that while identities may 
seem to be unitary, they in fact are defined, in large part, by the groups around them, and 
even more so by the establishment of outgroups. The relationships between these 
ingroups and outgroups were prominently described by Henri Tajfel in the 1970s, who 
suggested that individual identity is constructed based on the social group to which the 
individual belongs. Because of this, individuals can enhance their pride and self-esteem 
within their ingroup through comparison with outgroups. These ingroups, Tajfel argues, 
“may provide a basis for the building up a positive self-image, if it managed to preserve a 
system of positive evaluations about its ‘folkways’, mode of life, social and cultural 
characteristics.” (Tajfel 1982, 11). 
In the case of the Dayaks, the definition of these ingroups and outgroups is 
particularly important because it may be useful in explaining some aspects of group 
behavior. One might note that the recent flowering of Dayak identity has evolved through 
a struggle for recognition and justice within Indonesia. More specifically, decades of 
marginalization and conflict with other groups have been harmful to Dayak identity. This 
becomes particularly clear if one considers the significant numbers of Dayaks who 
converted to Islam in order to shed themselves of their Dayak identity throughout the 20th 
century (Tanasaldy 2012, 29).  
At the same time, though, through conflict with others, Dayak ingroups 
developed, over many years, a set of perceptions of clearly-defined outgroups (Malays, 
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the Indonesian State, the Madurese). Perhaps one of the most divisive distinctions, in 
some areas of Kalimantan, has been that of orang asli (indigenous person) and pendatang 
(newcomer) (Rhee 2009, 46). This has likely fed into a tightening of the Dayak ingroup, 
which, united through a common struggle, has now gained more opportunity for 
mobilization and activism in the realm of politics and forest tenure. Thus, Dayak identity 
constructions have become an important reference point for activists; the use of Dayak 
symbols represents a shared identity through which strong community groups can form.  
It is also important to note, however, that Tajfel’s theories on social identity have 
limits. People belong to more than one social group, and this is particularly true for the 
Dayaks. Recall that even the term “Dayak”, after all, was not chosen by the Dayaks, but 
instead was popularized by early European explorers (Tanasaldy 2012, 30). And, the 
“Dayak” label did not gain acceptance among the Dayaks until the 20th Century 
(Sillander and Alexander 2016). Further, people who identify with the term “Dayak” 
might also identify with smaller groups, like the Iban or the Kenyah. They also might 
identify with larger groups, like Borneans or Indonesians more generally. Thus, while 
theories of ingroups and outgroups certainly apply to the Dayaks, it would be misleading 
to not acknowledge that identifications with different groups intersect and interact with 
one another, and that the Dayaks are no exception.  
Development of outgroup perceptions 
 In discussing Dayak identity reconstructions, it also important to discuss how the 
boundaries separating Dayak identity from its outside have formed. Of course, some of 
these are clearer than others. Identity is complex, especially for the Dayaks, many of 
whom move through and belong to multiple groups. Regardless, like for many 
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marginalized communities, history has played a significant role in defining the 
relationships between the marginalized and their marginalizers. The Dayaks during the 
colonial period experienced severe social exclusion, when differentiations between the 
Dayaks and Malay Muslims grew increasingly stark. As Dutch colonization swept 
through Borneo, European conceptions of ethnicity were imposed upon the people of 
Kalimantan and contributed to the definition of the Dayaks as an island-wide ethnic 
group (Tanasaldy 2012, 30). Part of this grew out of a Dutch desire to contain the spread 
of Islam by establishing Christianity in its place. Further, the creation of ethnic group 
identities under colonial governments has been extensively studied. Some scholars have 
found that a range of actors, which might include missionaries, officials, and others, play 
a significant role in the construction of ethnic groups, often through the creation or 
imposition of ethnic labels (Nagel 1994). In the context of the Dayaks, although these 
labels sometimes had been used before colonization, they did not become mainstream 
until they were used in censes, reports, or other official documents created by the 
colonizing governments (Tanasaldy 2012, 31).  
The Dutch delineated the Dayaks in contrast to the Muslim Malays, and because 
many Dayaks remained animist in belief, to the Dutch, there was still opportunity for 
Dayak “salvation” and conversion to Christianity (Alcorn and Royo 2000). The Dayaks 
were also subject to corveé labor and taxation under the Dutch, whereas the Malay elite 
were afforded some degree of self-governance and were seen as a source of trade revenue 
(Davidson 2003, 3). The Dutch also applied an evolutionary approach to justify the 
marginalization of the Dayaks, whereby the Dayaks were seen as less evolved and low-
ranking compared to their European and Malay counterparts (Duile 2017). The Dutch 
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further accused the Dayaks of being incapable of managing their own land, and made 
attempts to outlaw shifting cultivation, which had long been the traditional means of 
sustenance for Dayak communities (Wadley 2007, 113).  
These factors together formed the basis of Dutch rule in Kalimantan and were the 
start of the development of a “state” presence in the region. Despite this, the Dayaks 
usually favored Dutch rule over the Malay Sultanate; Dutch Christian missionaries set up 
the beginnings of a formal education system for the Dayaks and tried to improve Dayak 
livelihoods (Tanasaldy 2012, 32). Although these efforts generally were unsuccessful, 
some Dayaks continued to favor Dutch rule up until Indonesian independence. And, the 
missionary education taught the Dayaks the Western ideals of liberty and democracy, 
which provided their activists a foundation upon which the first Dayak political 
organizations would later be formed (Davidson 2003, 6).  
  Many Dayaks who did not become Christian under Dutch rule instead converted 
to Islam. The marginalization of the Dayaks during the colonial era, and actually for 
decades thereafter, drove many Dayaks to convert. Widespread conversion to Islam, in 
fact, even predated colonial rule to the extent that the majority of Malays who lived 
upriver, or inland, were once Dayak (Ibid, 4). That is, conversion to Islam represented a 
shift not only in religion, but also, in some ways, in ethnicity and culture. For many 
Dayaks, to become Muslim was to partially escape the heavily marginalized Dayak 
identity and to become, to some degree, Malay (this was a process known as masuk 
Melayu, or to “enter” and “become” Malay) (Gerke 1997). These Dayaks, after their 
conversion, then became known as Senganan, and tended to distance themselves from 
their own Dayak communities quick;y after conversion (Tanasaldy 1981, 33). This also 
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sometimes happened through intermarriage, and in cases where Dayaks married Malays, 
they often underwent a religious ceremony that both converted them to Islam and 
assimilated them with the Malay ethnic group (Gerke 1997). 
Often this process consisted of an active renunciation of Dayak identity. In 1997, 
Solvay Gerke interviewed one Dayak woman who had married a Kutai Muslim man. She 
reported that after her conversion, she was no longer allowed to have any contact with her 
own ethnic group, which included being forbidden to visit her parents. She was also made 
to give up a number of Dayak culture practices, in which, before her marriage, she had 
actively participated. For example, she was no allowed longer to smoke or eat Dayak 
food (Gerke, 1997). Remarkably, then, there existed in some ways a distinct, but 
permeable delineation between ethnic groups.  
Thus, it is also important to note that identities are flexible. In Bornean societies 
this is particularly true. Some research has found that a more nuanced approach is crucial 
because ethnic standards that impose rigid ethnic categories oversimplify the processes of 
identity construction in Borneo (König 2016). The Dayak woman discussed above, for 
example, felt that she had not wholly abandoned her Dayak identity despite being made 
to leave behind many outward expressions of it. The imposition of ethnic categories 
would fail to include this important complexity.  
Regardless, for Dayaks who chose to convert to Islam, the advantages were many; 
Senganans enjoyed more access to education, avoided higher taxes, and were able to 
dissociate themselves from perceptions of the Dayaks as backward, primitive, and 
dangerous (Duile 2017). Further, Senganans were generally able to escape much of the 
marginalization they had experienced at the hands of the Malays, which for the most part 
		
18	
18	
had prevented them from participating in social activities beyond those of their own 
groups. Because of this, the Dayaks were entirely excluded from participating in any 
political activities beyond Dayak communities until Indonesian independence. Later, one 
question for activists was whether or not to extend the Dayak label to those who had 
previously converted to Islam yet expressed desire to participate in Dayak politics after 
World War II (Tanasaldy 2012, 24).   
Empowered Dayak communities and their role in governance 
 During Japanese occupation in the early 1940s, the Dayaks had yet to involve 
themselves in politics. Generally, positions of power had been reserved for the better-
educated Malay elite. Yet, the Japanese occupation was important for the later rise of 
Dayak politics; the execution of virtually all Malay Sultans revealed to the Dayaks that 
the Malays had in fact never been endowed with the supernatural powers that they had 
claimed, and therefore had no right to rule the Dayaks (Duile, 2017, 126). Furthermore, 
because of the disappearance and execution of the Malay elite under Japanese 
occupation, some educated Dayaks were appointed to the newly vacant political positions 
when Indonesia was liberated.  
 By the end of World War II and the early years of Indonesian independence in 
1945, the situation of the Dayaks in West Kalimantan began to shift. The Dayaks became 
much more involved in politics, as the loss of the local elite under the Japanese paved 
way for the installation of a new Dayak elite. In 1945, a group of Dayak schoolteachers, 
alongside a few other Dayak leaders, formed the Dayak in Action Party (DIA), which 
was transformed into the Dayak Unity Party (PD) a year later. PD then moved to 
Pontianak, the administrative center of West Kalimantan (Davidson 2003). Oevaang 
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Oeray, a founder of PD, emerged as a leader of the Dayak elite who advocated heavily 
for Dayak rights. Oeray would later become a symbol of the birth and development of the 
first Dayak political movements.  
In addition, with the help of the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA), 
the Dayak Affairs Office (DAO) was opened in 1946, and became the first organization 
established for the sole purpose of handling Dayak affairs. Later in 1946, seven Dayaks 
were appointed to the newly created West Kalimantan Council, which consisted of forty 
members in total. This was the first time that the Dayaks played an official role in 
policymaking. They were also given seats on local councils in a number of districts. 
Malay laws that had discriminated against Dayaks and perpetuated inequality were 
abolished; for one, it was finally mandated that the Dayaks received equal quality of 
education (Tanasaldy 2012). 
These sorts of strides, among other policies that increased Dayak participation in 
politics despite their comparative lack of experience and education, were in part a result 
of the post-war Dutch interim government. This helped secure Dayak support for the 
return of Dutch rule after World War II (Ibid, 19). Support from the Dayaks was critical 
for the Dutch government because the other significant ethnic group in Kalimantan, the 
Malays, were lukewarm at best to the reestablishment of Dutch rule.  However, after the 
transfer of sovereignty from the colonial government, the new Indonesian government 
accused the Dayaks of treason because of their past alignment with the Dutch.  
  However, not all Dayaks were supportive of the Dutch. It was also at this time 
that many Dayaks began to take a notably hostile stance toward colonial rule and its 
effects. Oeray argued that Dayak backwardness was not only a result of ignorance, but 
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also a result of circumstance after decades of marginalization and discrimination at the 
hands of the Dutch and the Malay Sultanate (Davidson 2003, 12-13). This obvious 
delineation of outgroups, in contrast to the Dayak ingroup, helped form the foundation 
for the Dayak political identity as it exists today.   
 Importantly, early Dayak leaders were rather bent on “modernizing” Dayak 
society. Education presented a significant problem for these leaders. On one hand, 
qualified Dayak educators were scarce. On the other, a general distrust existed of 
Indonesian teachers from outside of Dayak communities, whom the Dayak leaders feared 
would disfavor their students. In promoting modernization, PD leaders also encouraged 
Dayak communities to abandon their traditional practices. For example, Dayak 
communities were asked to adopt wet-rice cultivation to replace swidden agriculture. PD 
leaders also rejected longhouses, and argued that the Dayaks should instead live in single-
family homes (Davidson 2003, 14). So, the PD was harshly critical of not only the Dutch 
and the Malay Sultanate, but also of traditional Dayak practices, which, they believed, 
inhibited progress. While the Indonesian government, particularly under Suharto, was 
later largely blamed for the forced abandonment of traditional Dayak cultural practices, it 
is important to note that early Dayak political leaders also contributed to this.  
 Regardless, the PD was hugely successful in the first elections in West 
Kalimantan, and in the 1958 election, had become the largest ethnic political party in the 
province (Duile 2017, 127). However, Dayak politics again fell quiet after the 
implementation of President Soekarno’s regulations requiring the disbandment of all 
regional political parties for fear of secessionist movements. In the end, the PD was 
absorbed by other political parties, and because of this, the strength of Dayak political 
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identity declined (Ibid.). It is also important to note, however, that later, under Soekarno, 
the Dayaks participated in killings of ethnic Chinese, who had been accused of being 
communists in the 1960s (De Jonge and Nooteboom 2006, 204). Thus, the ethnic Chinese 
became another outgroup for the Dayaks, even though the Dayaks’ political force had 
largely dwindled.  
The Suharto Era 
 President Suharto, who served from 1967 to 1998, suppressed regional politics 
even further. Moreover, because Suharto’s highly centralized government denied the 
existence of ethnic groups in Indonesia, marginalized groups were prohibited from 
receiving preferential treatment. Further, there was very little opportunity for the Dayaks 
to participate in centralized governance, as any positions were heavily bureaucratic and 
dominated by the Javanese (Tanasaldy 2012, 37). The relative lack of education in Dayak 
communities also made participation difficult, as the Dayaks tended to be less qualified. 
All of these factors presented barriers for the Dayaks to involve themselves in politics 
during the 31-year-long term that Suharto served. 
Suharto’s denial of ethnic identity was harmful in other ways. In wanting to unify 
national identity, cultural diversity was suppressed (Li 2000). Furthermore, Suharto’s 
conception of national identity was heavily biased towards the Javanese, and, as such, 
ethnic groups throughout Indonesia had Javanese culture imposed upon them. Another 
effect of this was that areas where it was more difficult to impose a culture of national 
unity were often labeled as “isolated communities” (Duile 2017, 128). Because of this, 
many Dayak communities labeled as isolated became heavily romanticized in popular 
discourse and were associated with traditional ways of life.  
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Furthermore, Suharto’s regime went on to blame much of Indonesia’s degrading 
natural environment on the agricultural practices of the Dayaks, and blamed shifting 
cultivation specifically for forest fires and destruction (Ibid, 129). Longhouses, where 
numerous Dayak families often lived together, were labeled dirty, unhealthy, and, 
subsequently, illegal (Tanasaldy 2012, 40). Some communities were forced by the 
Indonesian military to destroy their own homes. The state under Suharto furthermore 
delegitimized Dayak animism by recognizing only five religions: Islam, Hinduism, 
Buddhism, Catholicism, and Protestantism. It was through these measures, among many 
others, that Suharto’s regime suppressed indigenous culture and excluded the Dayaks 
from the rest of the Indonesian mainstream unless they integrated in ways that the regime 
saw fit.  
Suharto also made substantial changes in Indonesian forestry policy, and this 
significantly facilitated the exploitation of Indonesia’s national resources by private 
interests, and in many cases removed customary land from the Dayaks and leased it to 
corporations. State control over natural resources was also tightened. These activities 
were almost always legitimized in the name of national interest, as the government 
claimed that they were necessary for Indonesia’s growth and development (Duile 2017).  
Dayak identity and ethnic conflict 
 Today, West Kalimantan is one of the most ethnically diverse provinces of 
Indonesia. The four ethnic groups in West Kalimantan are the Dayaks, the Kalimantese 
Malays, the Chinese, and the Madurese. While numerically, the Madurese migrant 
population has not been particularly significant, they have remained highly visible as they 
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often established their communities geographically separate from the other ethnic groups 
(Nooteboom 2010).  
The Madurese have occupied an important role as another outgroup for the 
Dayaks. Many Madurese were moved to West Kalimantan through Indonesia’s 
transmigrasi program, whereby hundreds of thousands of Indonesians were moved from 
overpopulated islands to outer, more rural areas of Indonesia in an attempt to redistribute 
Indonesia’s growing population (Henley and Davidson 2013, 10). Originally, the 
transmigrasi program was initiated by the Dutch colonial government, but by the end of 
Dutch rule it had largely faded from existence. It was, however, revived under Soekarno 
at the end of World War II, and ended two decades later. 
Transmigrasi fueled both ethnic tensions and environmental issues. First, the 
government grabbed land from the Dayaks and reassigned it to transmigrants, which led 
to accusations by the Dayaks that the government was giving preferential treatment to the 
migrants. There was also a widespread belief that the transmigrants were taking jobs from 
local communities (Tanasaldy 1981). These ethnic tensions fed into violent conflicts 
between the Dayaks and the Madurese in 1996 and 1997. Furthermore, the land that was 
distributed to the transmigrants was often converted to monoculture crop plantations, 
which were perceived as more modern compared to traditional Dayak methods of 
farming (Duile 2017, 130). Because of this, anti-plantation protests started among the 
Dayaks, although these remained rather small until NGOs later provided support.  
Violent ethnic conflicts arose in December 1996 and January 1997 in the district 
of Bengkayang. According to de Jonge and Nooteboom (2006), casualties numbered 
between 500 and 1200, the majority of which were Madurese. In 1999, violence again 
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erupted between the Malays and the Madurese, although the Dayaks quickly joined the 
side of the Malays. There were again hundreds of casualties, and thousands of Madurese 
were forced to flee to other islands (Peluso and Harwell 2001). The Madurese who did 
not flee, either by choice or inability, were placed into government-sponsored refugee 
camps. Violence again broke out in Sampit in Central Kalimantan, where again, hundreds 
died, and almost the entire Madurese population of Sampit, numbering near 150,000 
total, was evacuated to Madura and Java. In many places, in addition to the violence were 
rumors of beheadings and cannibalism. Virtually all traces of the Madurese were wiped 
out of these areas. In Sambas, the areas where the Madurese once lived, are nearly 
indistinguishable, except for abandoned mosques and banana trees (De Jonge and 
Nooteboom 2006).  
The media attributed much of this violence to a regression to the old Dayak 
cultural practices of headhunting. A Washington Post article wrote, “Almost all the 
victims have been Madurese, and many of them were beheaded by the Dayaks, who are 
descendants of a tribal group in Borneo known for practicing headhunting and 
cannibalism until the late 19th century. Some of the dead also had their hearts cut out” 
(Ch and Rasekaran 2001). Many Dayak accounts, however, cited that this violence was 
not tied to headhunting, but instead, that ethnic groups throughout Indonesia, including 
the Madurese, had used violent tactics in ethnic conflicts for decades (Nooteboom 2010). 
Regardless, much of the public discourse surrounding these attacks supported a 
preexisting stereotype of the Dayaks as primitive and violent. Even today, Borneo has 
consistently been labeled the “Land of the Headhunters”, instead of the “Land of the 
Dayaks,” which would of course be more accurate. Associating instances of violence 
		
25	
25	
with headhunting is also misleading; as described earlier, headhunting was a ritualistic 
cultural rite, and not associated with war in the way that it was framed by the media 
(Peluso and Harwell 2001).  
These sorts of conflicts had an important impact on Dayak identity. Although 
marginalization made some Dayaks ashamed of their identity, as resistance efforts against 
the government grew, indigenous identity increasingly more and more a point of strength, 
wherein greater unity emerged out of a common struggle. This is a pattern from which 
many social movements have emerged, as ingroup identity becomes strengthened in the 
presence of outgroups (Weisel and Böhm 2015).  
Dayak empowerment in the 21st Century 
 Finally, decentralization since the fall of Suharto has greatly changed the political 
climate of West Kalimantan. For one, regional governments have gained greater 
autonomy, as education, labor, public works, and natural-resource management are now 
under the purview of regional governments. These regional governments, furthermore, 
are now allowed to generate their own revenue and receive a higher share of tax revenue 
generated within their borders (McWilliam 2006, 56). While these adjustments took place 
all over Indonesia, in Kalimantan their effects were particularly strong. This was, in large 
part, because of the richness of the region’s natural resources. The areas of Kutai Timur, 
Kutai Bara, and Berau, for example, have become some of the wealthiest districts in 
Indonesia as a result (Asien et al. 2017, 15).   
Dayak communities have benefited from increased regional autonomy in a variety 
of ways. Their participation in governance has soared. Many districts in West Kalimantan 
are majority Dayak, which has bolstered the election of Dayak politicians to office 
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(Tanasaldy 2012). Furthermore, hierarchical village structures that had been imposed 
during the New Order were abolished, which allowed Dayak communities to return to 
their customary village governance systems.  Dayak communities, as a result of this 
empowerment, have also begun to reconstruct their identity, and ethnic pride has 
blossomed. One scholar noted, for example, upon arrival to East Kalimantan in 2016, the 
abundance of diverse ethnic symbols throughout Samarinda, the region’s capital city. He 
wrote, “wooden statues reminiscent of totem poles are installed adjacent to shopping 
malls and names of indigenous groups (suku) and locales from Borneo are inscribed in 
the urban environment through street and shop names” (Oesterheld 2016, 138). This is a 
reversal from what many Dayak communities have experienced historically.  
This represents a reversal from an unfortunate pattern of marginalization of the 
Dayaks, which predated colonial rule under the Malay Sultanate. This new pride has 
manifested itself in the outward expression of Dayak culture, and this is becoming 
increasingly visible all over Kalimantan. Longhouses, for example, which were once 
labeled dirty and associated with Communism, have been reclaimed and are now being 
used by politicians as centers for Dayak events. Other cultural symbols, including 
indigenous art, music, and dance, have also been repopularized (Ibid.). 
This has also consisted of a reclamation of traditional systems of forest 
management in Indonesia. Although indigenous groups in Indonesia in the past were 
marginalized and labeled as backward and uneducated in part because of their close 
relationship with the forest, they now have begun to reclaim their traditional management 
practices, which have been legitimized by centuries of experience having lived on that 
land. These arguments make sense; it is, further, in the best interest of communities that 
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are some of the most reliant on forest resources to focus efforts on managing these 
resources in a sustainable way, as it is fair to assume that these resources will continue to 
be valuable to them in the future. Thus, by strategically utilizing popular perceptions 
about the Dayaks being close to nature, activists have been able to use these to legitimize 
claims to land tenure, where the Dayaks now occupy roles as keepers of traditional, 
sustainable knowledge (Asien et al. 2017) 
This phenomenon was coined a ‘Revival of Tradition’ by Henley and Davidson 
(2013), who noted that decentralization was expected to bring alongside of it increased 
commitments to human rights and the fostering of a more open civil society. What was 
more unexpected, however, was that there was also a reconstruction of identity all over 
Indonesia. A wide range of regional manifestations of these patterns exists, but they 
likely share some common influences. A global indigenous peoples’ movement has given 
rise to similar revivals of ethnic identity; perhaps part of this is due to a shift in thinking 
of the political Left (Henley and Davidson 2013). That is, in recent decades the Left has 
placed a greater emphasis on cultural diversity and ethnic identity in opposition to 
constructions of nationalism or class. These arguments have been bolstered by an 
increased interest in indigenous rights. The International Labor Organization’s 
Convention 169, for example, recognized indigenous peoples’ right to a land base. More 
recently, the United Nations General Assembly also adopted the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous People in 2007, which set minimum standards for member states to 
meet in recognizing indigenous rights. Thus, one contribution to reconstructions of 
Dayak identity has been increased pride, which has flourished as part of a broader, 
international trend in the proliferation of human rights doctrines. 
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Chapter Three: Forestry, adat law, and the Indonesian state 
Adat law and the Dayaks 
As discussed previously, knowledge of traditional forestry practices may aid in 
legitimizing Dayak claims to user rights. Because of this, an understanding of Dayak 
forest management systems is important. As mentioned in Chapter 2, adat, or customary 
law, governs these traditional forest management systems. In fact, adat law prescribes the 
protocols that govern many aspects of decision-making in Dayak life, and is particularly 
salient in managing forest use. Unfortunately, Indonesian national law and customary law 
often are incompatible with one another. Thus, a tension exists where the Dayaks face 
pressure to maintain adat law, yet must also adhere to state law when it is required.  
Historically, the state’s observance and protection of customary law has remained 
rather weak in Indonesia. In the case of any inconsistencies between adat law and state 
law, state law prevails (Butt 2014). As a result, legally, adat law can only truly be 
enforced where gaps exist in state law. Furthermore, Indonesian state law has tended to 
be Western in nature, which in some cases is incompatible with adat law. One example is 
the Western concept of the “right of ownership”, under which land is registered and may 
be mortgaged. By contrast, under adat law, most land is communally held and controlled 
by the village head (Butt 2014, 66). Further, many indigenous communities prefer to live 
under the traditions of adat law, rather than national law, and will do so when they are 
able (Rahardjo 2016). For example, many Dayak civil and criminal cases are settled by 
village heads or adat heads and thus never see the Indonesian court system (Liu, Faure, 
and Mascini 2018, 58).  
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 Adat institutions are also crucial to the maintenance of Dayak forest resources 
because they govern the behavior of communities and their relationships with the 
physical environment (van Ast, Widaryati, and Bal 2014). Adat law distinguishes 
between two types of land ownership: community owned land (tanah milik kelompok), 
which usually is cleared by groups and might contain shared resources like fruit trees, 
and individually owned land (tanah milik perorangan) (Szczepanski 2002). Usually, an 
individual or family will cut down trees in a plot of land, burn the brush and debris that 
remain, and then use the ash to fertilize the soil, which, like in many forested areas 
globally, is nutritionally quite poor. Afterward, they cultivate the land, often for two or 
three crop cycles, and then the land is left fallow for another period, usually ranging 
between 10 or 15 years.   
 Through adat law, an association between swidden agriculture and what 
Westerners might call the “supernatural” exists as well, perhaps as a means to address the 
looming uncertainties with which swidden agrarian societies must cope. More 
specifically, Dayaks face issues like infertility of forest soils, insecure supply of resources 
like water, and abundance of pests.  Thus, one component of adat is a belief that humans 
may communicate with the spiritual world to ensure that natural forces will act in their 
benefit (Thomson 2000, 54). Thus, the relationship between swidden agriculture and adat 
law is quite close.   
Adat also governs the distribution of forest products among community members. 
These systems often are quite complex and involve a number of overlapping user-rights 
claims. For example, villages once consisted of several longhouses, in which many 
families lived communally. One longhouse might have held up to 60 apartments (Peluso 
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1993). Now, however, most villages consist of clusters of single-family homes, which 
share community-owned land as well as forest products from that land. In some cases, 
other villages or groups of outsiders pay a “tax” to the village to gain access to resources 
of the common property. Usually this consists of an in-kind contribution of 20 percent of 
whatever resources were harvested, although today, cash transactions also are common 
(Ibid.). Some forest products, regardless of whether they have been grown on community 
or privately-owned land, are common property of the village. For example, any 
community member may harvest mushrooms or bamboo shoots, even if they grow in a 
privately owned garden. These, again, are protected by legal systems that have been 
established under adat law.  
Further, if a villager wishes to plant on an unused swidden area that had 
previously been occupied by another villager, the first villager must obtain permission 
from his or her predecessor and the local adat authorities (McCarthy 2000, 108). These 
authorities usually consist of a community adat leader, who arbitrates conflict with 
respect to adat law, as well as an adat council, which enforces adat norms and rules. 
Councilmembers are usually appointed based on reputation and knowledge of adat 
(UNFAO n.d.). Thus, adat not only oversees the spiritual relationship between the human 
and the natural world, but also more practical arrangements of land inheritance, transfer, 
and management of collective properties. Again, many Dayaks see adat law as a central 
component of their cultural identity (Thomson 2000). Many also perceive the forest to be 
a very important source of cultural and spiritual benefits (Meijaard et al. 2013, 6) 
The Indonesian State and its forestry  
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Indonesian forests are generally extremely diverse, and are concentrated mainly 
on four islands: Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Papua. Land use change has been a 
serious issue in Kalimantan, where some of the primary threats forests are illegal logging, 
land conversion to oil palm plantations, and forest fires (Rosenbarger 2009). Further, the 
abundance of dipterocarpaceae, a family of hardwood trees, is especially valuable to 
loggers. More generally, the Indonesian State has classified all forest into three 
categories: production forest, protection forest, and conservation forest. Of these, 
production forests are the largest, and make up 66 percent of all forest (Sardjono and 
Imang 2015).  
Historically, the extraction of forest products has been a crucial source of revenue 
for Indonesia. Much of this revenue was generated from the sale of concessions to 
commercial logging companies in production forests (Sardjono and Imang 2015). For 
example, Suharto’s regime aimed for a stabilization strategy that underpinned the harvest 
and export of logs, which led to the investment of capital from large transnational 
corporations from the United States and Japan. By the 1970s, the forestry sector had 
become the second largest source of profit for the Indonesian government, after the oil 
sector (Hidayat 2015). It is important to note, further, that the oil sector has also been 
inextricably linked to deforestation; much of Indonesia’s oil is stored in its forested areas. 
The exploitation of both of these sectors, then, has led to rapid deforestation.  
Because of this, local communities have suffered, as their livelihoods rely on 
these depleting resources. These communities also have faced challenges of adaptation to 
changing government policies and environments despite having lived there for, in some 
cases, centuries. Additionally, for decades, shifting cultivators were accused of 
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environmental harm and the destruction of forests (Dove 1983). These shifting 
cultivators, along with landless migrant farmers, were often labeled the primary causes of 
deforestation in Indonesia (Soedjito 2015, 420). However, it has now been increasingly 
accepted that shifting cultivation can actually be quite sustainable. Further, the 
deforestation caused by shifting cultivation has been small in comparison to the 
deforestation related to corporate activity, like the felling of logs by timber companies 
(Angelsen 1995, 1713). Currently, shifting cultivators tend to hold more negative 
perceptions about the impacts of large-scale land clearing than do other groups (Meijaard 
et al. 2013, 6).  
 Historically, the Dutch imposed the first formal, top-down forest governance 
system in Indonesia, although adat law was still practiced on the outer islands under 
Dutch rule (Liu, Faure, and Mascini 2018, 33).  Since independence, the Indonesian 
government declared all forest under its authority, and thus is the primary actor 
responsible for its management and governance (Chipeta and Durst 2010). This has been 
asserted by the Indonesian Constitution, which gives the state the right to “control” its 
natural resources, and was later reaffirmed in the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) and 
the 1976 Basic Forestry Law (BFL), both of which served to further tighten the state’s 
grasp on natural resources (Liu, Faure, and Mascini 2018, 34). The 1976 BFL prohibited 
communal or private ownership of forest resources, which then allowed the state to grant 
forest concessions and then profit off of these concessions. Local communities suffered, 
as the state’s claims to forested areas often overlapped with their traditional land (Vargas 
1985). Furthermore, the state exaggerated the percentage of forest cover in certain areas 
in order to meet the baseline for the “forested area” designation and to ensure its 
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authority there accordingly (Liu, Faure, and Mascini 2018, 34). Both the BAL and the 
BFL, along with other relevant legislation, will be reviewed in Chapter 4.  
The Dayaks may register their land under the Indonesian state, which would 
confirm user rights for subsistence farming, but it is often prohibitively expensive and the 
application process is extensive and complex (Szczepanski 2002, 237). In the 1980s, 
conflict existed between the national government and the provincial government, as the 
national government stated that the right of land ownership should be granted to shifting 
cultivators, while the provincial government disagreed (Vargas 1985, 250). Although 
decentralization has brought numerous benefits for local communities, it has also 
worsened ambiguity in the law, complicated by disagreements among national, 
provincial, and local governments. The government’s failure to acknowledge swidden 
agricultural practices, which leaves lands fallow for years at a time, has also caused 
problems. The national government has, in some cases, declared fallow land as 
“abandoned”, even though the Dayaks likely would have later returned to it (Szczepanski 
2002). Because of this, it is much easier for the government to confiscate land at will, as 
officially it often is untitled and unregistered.   
However, as the process of decentralization has continued, the government has 
relinquished some of its authority over forestry. On one hand, decentralization has 
created the opportunity for the involvement of local actors. On the other, decentralization 
of forestry may have actually led to increased deforestation by district governments, 
which later caused the Ministry of Forestry to reclaim some of its initial authority in the 
years following 1999 (Hohne et al. 2018, 220). Like the national government, provincial 
and local governments have also faced corruption and enforcement issues in the 
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distribution of land titles, even though decentralization was expected to address these 
problems, which had long afflicted management at the national level. This emphasizes 
the need for greater community involvement, where accountability and transparency 
would, in theory, increase, as local populations expand their role in the management of 
resources.  
Yet, simultaneously, the expansion of the forestry sector has improved the lives of 
many; it has resulted in huge economic growth, poverty eradication, and created many 
jobs.  These trends continued following the 1970s. During the so-called “golden age” of 
forestry, forestry exports in the 1980s hovered around US $200 million per year, but by 
the 1990s had jumped up to US $2 billion per year (Sardjono and Imang 2015).  
During the Reformation Era, after the fall of Suharto in 1998, decentralization 
allowed for heightened participation of local communities in the forestry sector. And, this 
has been a platform upon which organizations like the United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the Center for International Forestry Research 
(CIFOR) have been able to encourage good governance in the realm of forest resource 
management. Significant progress has indeed been made. For example, criteria for 
sustainable forest management have been created, the divide between environmental and 
poverty reduction organizations has lessened, and conversations surrounding forestry 
policy have increasingly involved multiple stakeholders, which has led to more 
transparency and accountability (Hidayat 2015).  
However, the forestry sector, and more specifically, the Ministry of Forestry, has 
been notorious for corruption and mismanagement. Part of this arose from Suharto’s 
centralization of natural resource industries, which reduced transparency and allowed 
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government officials to exploit their authority for their own personal benefit. For 
example, in 2000, Bob Hasan, a former Minister of Trade and Industry in Suharto’s 
government, was tried for causing losses of around USD $75 million to the state and 
USD $168 million to the Indonesian Association of Forest Concessionaires (APHI) (BBC 
News 2000). Even today, corruption in the forestry sector is rampant. A huge source of 
revenue, near USD $15 billion per year in 2012, was a product of the sale of forestry 
permits that allow logging and other forms of forest resource extraction (Bachelard 
2012). One problem, then, has been the existence of a system of concessions awards 
dependent upon bribery of forest officials.  
Regardless, balancing conservation and development is difficult, as mentioned 
earlier. Historically, development in Indonesia has sometimes been antithetical to 
conservation. The country’s heavy reliance on natural resource exploitation, including on 
forest products and hydrocarbons, has meant that development often necessitated 
deforestation. And a shift in the past decade to heightened sustainability has in some 
ways intensified this conflict. Reducing carbon emissions, for one, hampers some of 
Indonesia’s most profitable industries. However, the government also has recognized that 
Indonesia will likely feel the effects of climate change intensely in the future. Climate 
change may lead to extremely costly trends of decreased rainfall, increased flood risk, 
and rising sea levels. One study found that the economic cost of droughts and fire in 
Indonesia in 1997-1998 was about USD $9 billion (Applegate et al. 2002). 
These issues are likely to worsen in the future as the climate change problem 
intensifies. Thus, the Indonesian state has a clear incentive to push for more effective 
sustainable practices, although it faces the challenge of balancing these against more 
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immediate economic development interests. Furthermore, Indonesia’s state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) are present in a variety of these industries, including in agriculture, 
mining, and energy, and as such, the Indonesian government itself directly profits from 
forest resource exploitation (Rosenbarger 2009). And, an estimated of 60 to 80 percent of 
Indonesia’s carbon emissions are a result of deforestation (Bachelard 2012). Regardless, 
these challenges have created opportunity for the Dayaks to assert themselves as keepers 
of traditional, sustainable knowledge. Efforts to better incorporate local communities into 
sustainable development have increased in Indonesia. This may help strengthen 
arguments for indigenous land ownership. 
Social forestry and common pool resource management 
One way that local communities have been incorporated into sustainable 
development efforts has been through social forestry programs. In more recent years, a 
growing global movement has increased the involvement of indigenous or local 
communities in sustainable resource management programs. These programs may help 
address some of the challenges that governments have faced in managing the resources 
on their own.  
While a changing political and economic environment in Indonesia has 
contributed to improving wellbeing nationally, the Dayaks continue to lag behind by 
some measures. Ethnic differences in economic activity have been one contributor. 
According to Nooteboom (2010), in Kalimantan, the Javanese tend to farm in 
transmigrasi-established areas, or work in the better-paid jobs of the service sector and 
the public sector. The Chinese own most of the shops in some areas of Kalimantan, and 
dominate the retail and supply sectors. Many of the Madurese are quite poor, and work in 
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strenuous physical labor, such as construction, garbage collection, and brickmaking, 
although some have opened businesses like repair shops and sate (grilled meat) stands. 
The Dayaks generally live relatively far away from towns.  
Further, in Indonesia, rural people dependent on state forests tend to be poor 
(Sunderlin, Dewi, and Puntodewo 2007, 32).  A close correlation between high forest 
cover and poverty also exists throughout most of Indonesia, although with some 
variation. In Kalimantan, high forest cover actually is correlated with a relatively low 
poverty rate (Ibid, 16). The reasons for this are unclear, although it could be that 
increased economic activity from natural resource extraction has helped lessen poverty in 
some areas. Another possibility is the positive impact of forest dwellers’ direct access to 
forest resources. According to Pambduhi, Belcher, and Dewi (2007), “Higher levels of 
forest resources and suitable land for agroforestry are also associated with higher welfare. 
Relatively remote, well endowed forest villages with limited economic alternatives show 
a high well-being relative to other villages in the area being studied.” (1431) It was also 
noted, though, that generally the majority of local people in their study area lacked access 
to forest resources and because of this were highly disadvantaged. This affirms the 
importance of securing access to forest resources for local communities.  
In Indonesia, the first social forestry programs were incorporated into national 
policy during the 1980s, but they faced challenges of navigating complicated and 
conflicting legislation that inhibited successful implementation. In 1995, the Ministry of 
Forestry introduced programs with a CBFM focus for the first time in Indonesia, under 
Ministerial Decree No. 622 of 1995 (Purnomo and Anand 2014, 29). The primary 
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purpose of the policy was to improve degraded forests and increase community 
participation, although the policy has since been altered multiple times. 
Since then, one criticism has been that the state-imposed social forestry programs 
have remained top-down in nature and conflict with unofficial community systems that 
had already been established for decades (Rosenbarger 2009). On the other hand, 
government involvement may also be important in ensuring the recognition of rights, 
facilitating conflict resolution, and providing technical support. Regardless, the changing 
political landscape in Indonesia has created opportunity for the Dayaks to manage their 
resources locally, partly because of political decentralization. Thus, for the Dayaks, one 
important question will be where the balance between government intervention and 
community autonomy exists.  
It is be useful first to examine some factors that have fed into the success of 
common pool resource management more generally. Elinor Ostrom (1999) has laid out 
eight design principles that central to long-enduring common-pool resources institutions:  
1. The resource should have clearly defined boundaries. The individuals 
and households who retain the rights to withdraw resources and the 
boundaries of that resource itself must be clear. 
2. Congruence should exist to ensure that the rules that assign benefits 
and the rules assign costs are fair. Participants must perceive these 
rules as fair as well.  
3. Users should be involved in collective choice arrangements that can 
modify operational rules governing the extraction of the resource. If a 
group of users perceive the system as unfair, it is important that 
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mechanisms to address their grievances exist, otherwise they may 
begin to cheat, and enforcement costs may rise.  
4. Monitoring is important to maintain accountability. Often the monitors 
are users themselves.  
5. Graduated sanctions should exist for users who violate operational 
rules that limit their participation in the institution.  
6. Users should have access to low-cost, effective conflict-resolution 
mechanisms. 
7.  Government authorities should not challenge the rights of users to 
form institutions.  
8. For common-pool resources that are part of larger systems, the above 
principles should be nested so that externalities may be addressed in a 
broader, cohesive organizational setting.    
 
It is important to note that social forestry programs vary substantially, and so must 
the implementation of these principles. Nonetheless, they are useful broad guidelines for 
understanding factors that have been demonstrated to be central to successful social 
forestry programs. For the Dayaks, many of these principles have not yet been met. 
Ostrom’s principles that have had particular effect on the Dayaks will be discussed 
below. 
With respect to Design Principles 1, Chapter Four will discuss ambiguities in 
Indonesian law that lead to a lack of clearly defined boundaries. Even in instances where 
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these boundaries have been clearly defined, further, in some cases communities have 
continued to see their land rights violated.  
Furthermore, increasing the involvement of local communities benefits not only 
the communities themselves, but may also help address some of the challenges the 
government has faced surrounding the monitoring and enforcement of forestry policy. 
This would help address Design Principles 3 and 4.  For one, forests in Indonesia can be 
large and scattered, and in areas where forest cover percentage is high, protecting forest 
borders from outside users can be costly. Forests are particularly scattered in West 
Kalimantan, compared to the rest of Borneo (Meijaard et al. 2013, 3). When communities 
are allowed to use the forests, they have an incentive to engage in enforcement against 
outside users. Conversely, if communities are not allowed to use the forests, they are less 
likely to report violators, as they could face legal repercussions themselves (Robinson et 
al. 2012). Legal community involvement also protects biodiversity; by defining the 
groups with legal access to forest resources, overexploitation of these resources becomes 
less of an issue, first, because local communities become more likely to enforce this 
exclusivity, and second, because there are fewer groups of people extracting these 
resources in the first place.   
Another problem is a lack of government support, which likely hampers 
legitimacy, conflict-resolution, and training. This leads to issues described by Design 
Principle 7, in which the state might also be overly heavy-handed and therefore risks 
infringing upon the authority of local communities when it is unnecessary to do so. 
Increasing the involvement of capacity-building organizations might be beneficial in 
providing support where the government has been lacking, ensuring fairness in 
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community involvement in decision-making, and bringing issues to the agenda as needed. 
However, stronger networks among groups are needed. For example, Alianzi Masyarakat 
Adat Nusantara (AMAN) (Alliance of Indigenous Peoples of the Archipelago) is the 
primary organization representing the interests of indigenous communities. According to 
their website, they represent 2,366 communities with a total population of over 18 million 
(AMAN n.d.). While their main focuses are land reform and the recognition of 
community rights to self-governance, forestry and land tenure are other key issues. 
Because of its broad focus, however, AMAN has found itself stretched rather thin and 
thus, in the realm of forestry, has mainly focused on raising attention to issues 
(Colchester 2002, 23). More focused capacity-building organizations, working with 
AMAN, could be beneficial.  
It is also important to note, though, that the Indonesian government has indeed 
made significant efforts toward more effective community forestry. On one hand, 
decentralization was expected to increase the sustainability of forest management by 
more effectively incorporating local communities. Yet, its effects instead have 
contributed to mass exploitation of forest resources by regional governments, as this is 
often the fastest and easiest way to develop their economies and increase their income 
(Sardjono and Imang 2015).  
With respect to Design Principle 7, the main reason why governments take 
control of forestry is due to concern that, without government regulation, resources will 
be over-used and will become depleted. This is the tragedy of the commons. After 
decentralization, while regional governments may have had the best interests of 
conservation in mind, the implications of an approach that excludes local people from 
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forest use is neither fair nor practical. The hope is that community involvement would 
help address some of the challenges that the government has faced when using a top-
down approach.  
The increased opportunity for social forestry was borne, at least partly, out of 
decentralization. In theory, encouraging community participation in decision-making 
processes would better support options that benefit local communities. This might 
include, for example, improved recognition of indigenous rights as well as heightened 
utilization of traditional forest management practices. Decentralization has also increased 
the pressure for local elected officials to pay attention to the wants and needs of 
constituents. Better transparency has the potential to decrease corruption. The 
government would likely also benefit from increasing its own transparency and 
accountability. For one, the national government has lost significant revenue from the 
exploitation of forest resources in the logging industry due to corruption and tax evasion 
(Human Rights Watch 2009). 
Awareness of forestry programs presents another issue. Many communities in 
Kalimantan, particularly those located in forests, may lack information on how to 
participate in social forestry programs. Forestry and its related laws in Indonesia are 
constantly changing, so it can be difficult for communities to keep up. This can challenge 
Ostrom’s Design Principles at all levels. Without knowledge of the rules, or how to 
participate in these programs in the first place, it is of course not possible to have long-
enduring common resource management systems.  State-sponsored educational programs 
might help mitigate this issue. Furthermore, in order to encourage communities to 
consider forestry as a long-term project, states should make the permit application more 
		
43	
43	
flexible, extend permit periods, and make renewals easier. This might help address some 
concerns that decentralization feeds into decision-making focused only on the short-term. 
Further, the current system is unclear, and permits may be subject to revocation if they 
are perceived to conflict with state interests (Rosenbarger 2009). A more comprehensive 
set of recommendations will be elaborated upon at the conclusion of this thesis.  
Still, real concerns about increasing community involvement exist. For one, some 
worry that local groups might lack long-term perspective and fail to see greater potential 
consequences of some decisions. Further, the rapid decentralization that Indonesia 
underwent has meant that local governments are often unequipped to handle their new 
responsibilities (White and Smoke 2005). As mentioned before, one example of this was 
widespread corruption surrounding forestry concessions by provincial governments after 
decentralization. So, another issue is government support. The government faces the 
challenge of promoting community involvement by providing technical support and 
training, while also allowing enough freedom for communities to have real decision-
making powers.  
Forestry and the International Community 
It is also important to note that many forest products serve as public goods, not 
just for Indonesia, but for the international community as well. Forests are critical to 
protecting biodiversity and carbon sequestration, both with global repercussions. The 
increasing threat of climate change has brought these issues to the forefront of the 
international agenda. Carbon sequestration is especially relevant now, with the 
establishment of carbon credit programs under the United Nations Programme on 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (UN-REDD+)(Bayrak, 
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Mustafa, and Marafa 2016). However, efforts to lower forest carbon emissions have not 
impacted all stakeholders equally. UN-REDD+, in particular, has raised concerns 
regarding the extent to which local communities will be included in land and natural 
resources use. UN-REDD+ incentivizes countries to use forest carbon emissions as a 
standard to measure a country’s performance, and thus how much financial reward it 
should receive (Astuti and Mcgregor 2015). 
 In theory, UN-REDD+ could promote poverty alleviation if it improves local 
participation in forest governance, and if funds from carbon credits are distributed to 
local communities. However, it could also threaten local communities, if, for example, it 
prevented them from using forest resources for subsistence (Bayrak, Mustafa, and Marafa 
2016). Again, a tendency exists for the government to maintain its control, and 
motivating it to reduce carbon emissions may also encourage it to insulate the forest from 
development all together. 
To protect local communities, UN-REDD+ has implemented safeguards, such as 
its guidelines on Free Prior and Informed Consent, to help ensure transparency and 
increased community participation. However, when governments do not recognize 
indigenous rights to start, these safeguards lack impact. In Indonesia, one issue has been 
that land tenure agreements are often unclear and poorly enforced, so Free Prior and 
Informed Consent guidelines are then largely symbolic (Bayrak, Mustafa, and Marafa 
2016). Capacity-building programs have been established to help empower local 
stakeholders and to ensure their benefit from UNREDD+, with limited success.  
Communities in Indonesia have lacked technical knowledge and skills as well as 
the organizing skills required for effective collaborative planning (Larrabure and 
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Moeliono 2013).  Thus, one challenge for the Dayaks will be how to navigate these 
systems and establish leadership that can adequately organize communities and 
communicate with outside groups. Furthermore, even after community forestry programs 
have been implemented, monitoring and enforcement represent significant issues. 
Funding is limited, and government spending on the environment decreased throughout 
the 1990s and 2000s (Aden et al. 2001). While since then, the budget allocation for 
environmental planning has increased, the World Bank has noted that Indonesia’s 
macroeconomic policies continue to disfavor environmental sustainability, as they reward 
revenue rather than stewardship (Wingqvist and Dahlberg 2008). Lack of infrastructure 
needed to access forests, like roads and trails, also make enforcement issues problematic. 
Capacity-building organizations will probably play an important role in providing 
technical support and expertise. And, as discussed previously, increased community 
involvement may help mitigate some of the issues surrounding monitoring and 
enforcement. 
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Chapter Four: Indonesian Law and Adat Communities  
 As discussed earlier, one serious challenge for the Indonesian government has 
been the question of how to address regulating access to forest resources. The 
government must balance a wide range of interests, including those of adat communities, 
corporations, and conservation advocates. While these are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive, they have often been at odds with one another. Legislation aimed at addressing 
these issues has been passed, although problems of ambiguity harm invocation of the law 
and can lead to corruption and mismanagement.  
These problems have a direct impact on adat communities, whose livelihood 
strategies often rely on availability of and access to forest resources. This chapter will 
discuss legislation affecting these communities, but it is first important to understand how 
the Indonesian state defines indigeneity, as this is of course fundamental to understanding 
the law. However, currently, different terms are used to refer to indigenous people. 
According to a report by AMAN, an organization which represents interests of 
indigenous Indonesians, the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Environment 
and Forestry have identified some groups as “geographically isolated communities” 
(komunitas adat terpencil), while other government legislation instead uses the term 
“customary law societies”, or “customary law communities”, (masyarakat hukum) a 
colonial term (Coalition for Enforcement of Law 2017). Using the term “geographically 
isolated communities” has been understood by some to refer to areas where it has been 
more difficult to impose an image of national unity (Duile 2017). The term “indigenous 
peoples” (masyarakat adat) is the term that has been frequently promoted by indigenous 
peoples’ networks and NGOs; AMAN itself stands for Aliansi Masyarakat Adat 
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Nusantara (Indigenous People’s Alliance of the Archipelago). In addition to these, 
however, other groups claiming indigeneity exist, outside of those identified by the 
government as indigenous.   
Even among the international community, some ambiguity exists surrounding 
how indigenous groups should be defined. The 2013 United Nations Manual for National 
Human Rights Institutions, for example, even notes that there is no universally agreed 
upon definition for indigeneity. One factor is the concern that adopting a formal 
definition at the international level removes flexibility and, instead, communities should 
be allowed to define their indigeneity as they see fit. This, however, creates challenges 
for countries like Indonesia, where there has long been conflict over how to define 
indigeneity.  In some instances, groups might have an interest in labeling themselves 
indigenous, if, for example, indigenous groups gain exclusive access to particular 
resources. Thus, reason exists to restrict the definition of indigeneity; indigeneity as 
grounds for special rights loses meaning if outside groups manage to exploit this. At the 
same time, though, retaining flexibility is also important, as it recognizes and protects the 
diversity of indigenous groups within Indonesia.  
Thus, defining indigeneity has been an issue within groups claiming customary 
land rights in Kalimantan. In the context of Indonesia, indigenous groups often have been 
mobile, which complicates definitions of indigeneity that emphasize historical ties to a 
particular tract of land. For example, in Malinau, in East Kalimantan, the Merap, an 
indigenous group with historical claims to the area, differentiate themselves and the 
Kenyah, another Kalimantese indigenous group, by labeling themselves orang asli 
(indigenous or original person) and the Kenyah pendatang (migrant or 
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newcomer)(Wollenberg, Moeliono, and Limberg 2009). That is, although the Kenyah are 
indeed Dayak, and are, like the Merap, indigenous Kalimantese, they are nonetheless 
referred to as non-indigenous, because of their relatively new arrival to a given area. 
Thus, while to an outsider, the Merap and the Kenyah might appear equally indigenous, 
that is not always how it is perceived within indigenous groups. Further, for the Kenyah, 
who migrated to Malinau in the 1960s and 1970s, their classification as migrants is 
significant, as it could threaten their claims to land. The Merap, who are far fewer in 
number, occupy large tracts of land within Malinau based on historical claims, even 
though the Kenyah are indigenous to East Kalimantan as well (Ibid.)     
In addition to indigeneity, other issues of ambiguity in the law also impact natural 
resource management and conservation. One example surrounds the issue of 
deforestation.  On one hand, in some cases, activities leading to deforestation are legal, 
and even actively encouraged by the state. This might include, for example, drilling to 
access oil reserves. In 2018, the government cut several regulations in an effort to 
increase investment in oil and gas, which had been declining (Yuniarni 2018).  In other 
cases, deforestation might be illegal, though facilitated by state officials, such as when 
logging permits are distributed corruptly (Bachelard 2012).  
And, as mentioned in the previous chapter, natural resource extraction is a 
significant contributor to Indonesia’s gross domestic product (GDP).  In 2017, 
agriculture, forestry, and fishing contributed to around 13 percent of the nation’s GDP. 
While these figures have declined significantly from previous decades (in 1986, 
agriculture, forestry, and fishing contributed as much as 24.3 percent), natural resources 
continue to play a substantial role in Indonesia’s national economy (World Bank 2017). 
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Yet, conservation and indigenous communities represent other interests against 
which the Indonesian government must balance these revenue sources. Thus, in one 
scenario, where deforestation is a consequence of legal activities, one strategy might be 
to encourage the Indonesian government to pass regulatory legislation. Initiatives like 
UNREDD+ have attempted to achieve this, with some success, by creating incentives for 
governments to reduce carbon emissions. Indonesia has passed some legislation that 
outlines mechanisms for reducing carbon emissions with UNREDD+ support (The 
REDD Desk 2015). In another scenario, however, where deforestation occurs illegally, 
and the Indonesian government is either complicit or is simply unable to effectively 
monitor and enforce the law, increasing local community involvement has great potential. 
And, Indonesian law is critical here.  
As has been emphasized throughout this thesis, recognizing forest access and 
ownership for indigenous communities like the Dayaks decreases corruption from 
government officials; increased community participation encourages transparency in 
political processes. Further, it can motivate local groups to monitor and enforce land use 
protections from encroachers. This chapter, then, will review, first, Indonesian legislation 
affecting adat communities, and second, how this legislation, alongside government 
programs, forms a changing legal environment that adat communities have been required 
to navigate. Lastly, case studies demonstrating some of the challenges in implementing 
this legislation will be discussed.  
Legislation affecting adat communities 
The Indonesian Constitution  
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 As mentioned previously, the existence of adat communities was first recognized 
in the 1945 Constitution, which contains two articles that directly impact indigenous 
communities.  
The first of these is Article 18B(2), which states that the government must respect adat 
customary land rights: 
The State shall recognize and respect, to be regulated by law, the homogeneity of 
societies with customary law along with their traditional rights for as long as they 
remain in existence and in agreement with societal development and with the 
principle of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. 
While this is significant, one issue is that the Constitution avoids the term adat 
community (masyarakat adat) which conveys a connotation of autonomy compared to 
the term traditional community (masyarakat tradisional) (Bedner and Huis 2008, 170). 
An important question is, if a community is perceived by the government to no longer be 
“traditional,” whether or not it retains its “traditional rights”. These rights themselves are 
also unspecific, and the Constitution fails to clarify exactly what rights they encompass. 
Further, the stipulation that adat law must not interfere with the law of the State fails to 
protect adat communities in a meaningful way. Limiting indigenous protections by 
requiring that they do not hinder state interests is a consistently used strategy, as will be 
illustrated in later legislation.  Former President Suharto later claimed that all Indonesians 
are equally indigenous, which effectively removed any special status from adat 
communities (Li 2000, 149). The 1945 Constitution’s insufficient protections for adat 
communities likely played a role.  
Basic Agrarian Law and Basic Forestry Law 
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Restriction of property rights is one method that the Indonesian government has 
used to confront problems of deforestation. As mentioned in previous chapters, public, 
private and community forests exist in Indonesia, although ambiguity surrounding how 
these are defined has led to conflicts between users. The 1960 Basic Agrarian Law and 
the 1967 Basic Forestry Law together comprise the primary pieces of legislation 
governing natural resources, and thus impact the access of adat communities to these 
resources.  
The Basic Agrarian Law in particular has had an immense impact on the 
regulations of traditional land rights for indigenous communities. To start, at its surface, 
the Basic Agrarian Law appears to protect adat rights in a meaningful way, stating that is 
necessary that “a National Agrarian law is established, based upon the Adat-law,” and, 
later, in Article 5, that “the Agrarian law which applied to the earth, water and air space 
Is Adat-Law…” (Act No. 5 of 1960 Concerning Basic Regulations on Agrarian 
Principles 1960). However, Bedner and Huis argue that the Basic Agrarian Law redefines 
adat law from its common usage, and instead, means “the original law of a group of 
Native Indonesians (2008, 178). Thus, it longer acknowledges the wide variety of adat 
laws in Indonesia. The state’s failure to recognize the diverse set of interests among adat 
communities presents significant challenges to communities interested in claiming 
customary rights. According to a 1990 Environesia publication, the government later 
remarked that “in reality adat laws are so diverse and widespread that [it] is nearly 
impossible to adequately incorporate all adat principles into a national law…” (as cited in 
Rossabi 1999, 35). 
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Furthermore, similar to the Constitution, the Basic Agrarian Law, in Article 5, 
goes on to state that adat law must not conflict with the “National and State’s interests 
based on the unity of the Nation, With Indonesian Socialism as well as with the 
regulation stipulated in this Act and with other legislative regulations…” Despite the 
allusion to Communism, however, the Basic Agrarian Law was also, for the most part, 
based upon individual notions of land ownership, and often failed to recognize communal 
or collective land tenure, which then severely limited the traditional adat systems of 
community land tenure (McWilliam 2006).  
Thus, as discussed previously, national and state interests retain priority over the 
customary rights of indigenous communities. Finally, in Article 9(2), the law requires 
that all Indonesians must have equal opportunity to acquire land, which then prohibits 
indigenous communities from obtaining any special rights, as well as from establishing 
their own laws regulating use on adat land (Bedner and Huis 2008, 179) .  
The Basic Forestry Law of 1967 built upon the Basic Agrarian Law, although it 
contained even fewer protections for indigenous communities. Part of this was probably 
due to its passage under the New Order, led by Suharto, who was particularly hostile to 
adat rights. The Basic Forestry Law required that adat lands be classified as state forest, 
and not private forest, which forced adat communities, now living on state forest, to 
follow national forestry policy (Act No. 5 of 1967 Concerning Basic Provisions of 
Forestry 1967). As a result, adat communities lost their rights to till land within the 
forest, and instead retained only the rights to collect forest products (Bedner and Huis 
2008, 182).  In some cases, adat communities could not adequately support themselves 
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and were forced to move to other areas. Many of these communities left with neither 
compensation nor recognition of their customary claims (McWilliam 2006). 
The Basic Forestry Law also continued to severely weaken communal rights for 
indigenous communities, and made cases where adat laws was implemented in a manner 
that, in its own language, “disturb[ed] the goals stipulated in this law” illegal. This 
referred, in some cases, to perceived interference with national interests in conservation 
and production, but in others, it referred to communities using their rights to obstruct the 
construction of development projects, including “large-scale forest clearance for large 
projects, or in the interests of transmigration, and so on.” Again, this demonstrates the 
damage that the Basic Forestry Law caused to the rights of indigenous communities. 
However, since the fall of the New Order government, the changing political system in 
Indonesia has fostered democratization and decentralization. 
However, the speed with which this has occurred has created significant impacts 
on indigenous communities, both positive and negative. Thus, this chapter will continue 
to explore more recent legislation concerning the recognition of human rights, 
decentralization, and reclassification of indigenous land. Partly as a result of these 
policies, labeled reformasi (reformation), Indonesia has experience a flourishing of 
identity politics.  
Act No. 39 of 1999 Concerning Human Rights 
 Following the fall of Suharto in 1998, adat communities were once again 
recognized in national legislation. Act No. 39, in Article 6, states:  
The differences and needs of indigenous peoples must be taken into consideration 
and protected by law, the public, and the Government. The cultural identity of 
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indigenous peoples, including indigenous land rights, must be upheld, in 
accordance with the development of the times. 
 The acknowledgement of indigenous land rights is important. Later in the Act, in 
Articles 36 and 37, rights to own property, and freedom from arbitrary or unlawful 
seizure are also guaranteed, along with a requirement that “the right to ownership of a 
property in the public interest shall not be revoked, except with the restoration of fair, 
proper and adequate compensation, based on prevailing legislation.” While the rights to 
ownership indeed are significant, one issue is that indigenous groups often are not 
granted ownership, and instead, are granted only use rights.  
 As a 2002 report from the Asia Development Bank noted, Articles 6, 36, and 37 
together are relevant in the protection of adat land rights, as they require that any seizure 
of adat land must be done through fair, legitimate means, where adat communities have 
given free and prior informed consent (Asia Development Bank 2002). In practice, 
however, this has not been the case.   
 Act No. 22 of 1999 Concerning Local Government and Act No. 32 of 2004 Concerning 
Regional Administration 
Changes in governance structure resulting from decentralization have had 
substantial impacts on the management of Indonesia’s forests. Immediately following 
Suharto’s regime, a series of laws were passed, which shifted power from the central 
government to district governments and municipalities (Liu, Faure, and Mascini 2018). 
Post-Suharto, the Indonesian government has adopted two pieces of legislation on 
regional autonomy: Act No. 22 of 1999 Concerning Local Government and Act No. 32 of 
2004 Concerning Regional Administration. 
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These replaced the existing Act No. 5 of 1979, which reduced, and in some cases, 
eliminated, the autonomy of adat institutions. Under Act No. 5 of 1979, new governance 
structures, based on Javanese village models, had been introduced, and adat institutions 
were incorporated into these new structures, which had severely limited their decision-
making power, and required that all decisions be subject to district head approval (Bedner 
and Huis 2008, 172). The traditional adat leaders were excluded from natural resource 
management in particular, and instead, their responsibilities were reduced to facilitating 
adat ceremonies. (Asia Development Bank 2002).  
 Act No. 22 of 1999 reformed the village governance structure that had been 
imposed under Act No. 5 of 1979. It allowed traditional forms of village government to 
be re-installed, and also encouraged democracy at the local level (Bedner and Huis 2008, 
172). Its preface states: 
Law No. 5/1979 on regional administrations (Statute Book No. 56/1979, 
Supplement to Statute Book No. 3153), which brings uniformity in the name, 
form, structure and position of village administrations, is no longer compatible 
with the spirit of the Constitution of 1945 and the need to recognize and honor the 
right of regional origin, which is special in nature, so that it must be replaced. 
Act No. 22 of 1999 thus removed the hierarchy among local, district, and 
provincial governments that had been imposed by the central government. In other words, 
local district heads were no longer required to report to the governor regarding local-level 
decisions. The Act also granted local governments increased financial responsibility for 
infrastructure and personnel, including for schools and roads. However, conflicting 
interpretations on two Articles within the Act have led to disagreements between local 
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officials and the Ministry of Forestry (Rosenbarger 2009, 19). Article 8 stipulates the 
central government retains the authority to regulate issues of natural resource 
management, while Article 10 requires local governments to retain responsibility for 
protecting natural resources.  
Act No. 32 of 2004 builds upon Act No. 22 of 1999, and in Article 12, it further 
acknowledges the importance of local culture and tradition in establishing local 
governance systems: 
Village or the like means a unity of constitutional community which has borders 
and the authority to govern and manage the interest of the local people based 
 on the history and custom of the local community acknowledge and respected 
within the frame of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia. 
The Act, however, also maintains that villages must remain under the guidance of 
government regulation. Thus, while the law allows for more autonomy, higher levels of 
government retain control (Bedner and Huis 2008).  
Act No. 39 of 2014 on Plantation Development 
Act No. 39 of 2014 addresses the rights of indigenous people in instances of land 
appropriation. In Article 12(1), it states, “companies must consult indigenous land right 
holders to obtain agreement on the delivery of land and compensation.”  Further, Article 
103 explicitly prohibits government officers from issuing permits of the land of 
indigenous rights holders, and threatens a five-year prison term as well as a fine of five 
billion rupiah (around US $350,000).  
Constitutional Court Decision No. 35/PUU-X/2012 of May 2013 
In 2013, Indonesia’s Constitutional Court affirmed the rights of indigenous 
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peoples to their land and customary forests. In doing so, it extensively references human 
rights instruments, including ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
(Coalition for Enforcement of Law 2017). It also amended Indonesia’s 1999 Forestry 
Law, which said, “customary forests are state forests located in the areas of custom-based 
communities.” The decision removed the word “state” from this definition, and thus now 
says, “customary forests are forests located in the areas of custom-based communities.” 
This affirmed that customary forests are no longer a part of state forests, and was a shift 
from the classifications that had previously been established under the 1999 Basic 
Forestry Law (Sari 2013, 21). However, how to establish customary forest, in practice, 
remains unclear. Again, ambiguities surrounding land tenure policy hurt both indigenous 
communities as well as the forests in which they live.  
In some other ways, the situation in Indonesia has been improving. For one, the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court has been central to the recognition of indigenous land 
user rights. Since the fall of Suharto in 1998, the Court has emerged as one of the greater 
successes of the Indonesian reformation movement, or reformasi. After its establishment 
in 2003, it has been perceived as independent from other branches of government, 
competent, and fair: a significant achievement given the corruption rampant in 
Indonesia’s broader political environment (Butt, 2014, 60). Further, although the Court 
has no enforcement powers, it has relied on its reputation and popular support to add 
legitimacy to its decisions. However, the Court’s reputation has declined after a scandal 
in 2013, in which the Court’s Chief Justice, Akil Mochtar, was arrested for allegations of 
receiving bribes and money laundering (The New York Times 2014). Because of the 
Court’s reliance on its reputation, this was a significant blow to its political and legal 
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clout. Thus, it is unclear how scandals like this might impact the enforcement of its 
rulings in the future.    
Draft Bill on the Recognition and Protection of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
A draft bill, which was placed on a list of bills for the current House of 
Representatives 2014-2019 term, would legally enshrine the rights of indigenous 
Indonesians, following the 2013 Constitutional Court decision. In 2018, however, the 
Indonesian government signaled that the bill was not likely to pass, dubbing it “not a 
necessity,” and wrote that, if passed, it would create budget problems, spark conflicts, 
and encourage indigenous beliefs contrary to the six religions recognized by the 
government (Rogers 2016).  While a number of more fragmented laws on indigenous 
rights had been passed, this bill would have tied them together. 
 Controversy over the draft bill has had recent political implications. Although 
current President Jokowi was labeled the first-choice candidate of AMAN during the 
2014 presidential election because of his commitments to indigenous issues, AMAN has 
since pulled its support for Jokowi in the upcoming April 2019 election. The former 
President of AMAN, Abdon Nababan, has stated that AMAN now represents over 24 
million indigenous voters, so Jokowi’s failure to push for the passage of the draft bill will 
hurt his campaign (Gokkon 2019).   
International Treaties 
Additionally, Indonesia is now a signatory to the 2007 United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. While this commitment is non-binding, it 
nonetheless enshrines rights that “constitute the minimum standards for the survival, 
dignity and well-being of the indigenous peoples of the world,” as well as their protection 
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under national and international law (United Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs 2007). However, the government has continued to dispute the concept of 
indigeneity, claiming, in some instances, that all Indonesians are equally indigenous, with 
the exception of the ethnic Chinese. This has created a basis for the government to reject 
indigenous rights claims (Coalition for Enforcement of Law and Human Rights in Papua 
2017). Of course, this stands in stark contrast to previous legislation and court rulings, 
where the government has used language that explicitly acknowledges and recognizes the 
existence of indigenous people and their rights.  
The pathway to recognition of forest claims through adat law 
The substantiation of forest claims through recognition of adat law is embedded 
within the Indonesian national law framework, and requires that communities meet 
several criteria. Whether or not communities meet these criteria is decided by an 
independent committee of experts. These criteria are that “adat is practised according to 
its rules; adat leadership/institutions still exist; territory is clearly established; and the 
people still depend upon the forest.” (De Royer et al. 2015, 225)  
However, one issue is that although the government requires formal, written 
documentation to substantiate claims, when little conflict exists, people often turn to 
informal forms of settlement, including through adat heads, rather than through legal 
offices. This can lead to a lack of formal documentation. Furthermore, although some 
groups had begun documenting their adat laws in the 1960s, other groups began more 
recently. Thus, groups like the Iban, who have a long history of formal documentation, 
may have stronger claims. Conversely, other groups who began the process of formal 
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documentation more recently have had the opportunity to “construct” history with the 
knowledge of how to use this history to their advantage (Ibid.).  
Regardless, the Draft Bill on the Recognition and Protection of the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, which has been stalled in the current House of Representatives, has 
included some provisions to change the process. According to Arizona and Cahyadi 
(2013), under the Bill, the recognition process would consist of three stages: 
identification, verification, and ratification. Each stage, further, has its own set of criteria. 
Within the identification stage, local communities must demonstrate a history of adat law 
communities; adat territory; adat law; adat property rights, inheritance, and artifacts; and 
a customary governance system. A community would be able to initiate the identification 
process on its own, or may choose to work with the local government in doing so. 
Following the initial identification process, the case would then be passed to the regency, 
provincial, or state level Committee on the Indigenous Peoples, depending on the scope 
of the claim, for verification. The criteria that these committees consider would be 
distinct, and add an element reflecting customary land management by native peoples 
more specifically.  
If the case passes the verification stage, it then would be sent to the regent, 
governor, or president for the third stage, approval. Who decides in the final verification 
stage would depend upon the geographical scope of the claim; if the claim is limited to a 
single regency, it is decided by the regent, while if the claim spans multiple provinces, 
the president has the final decision. Communities then would be given the opportunity to 
challenge the decision. There are, however, some issues here. For one, the model relies 
heavily on non-independent, political actors, like the governor and president, who are not 
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impartial. Because these actors are accountable to satisfying the needs of voters, for 
example, it is conceivable that their decisions may be swayed by outside groups. Further, 
national the government has signaled that it is unlikely to pass the Bill regardless.  
Government programs 
  In addition to legislation, the Indonesian government has developed a number of 
programs aimed at promoting conservation. These include forest certification and related 
community-based forest management systems. Historically, the Indonesian government’s 
attitude towards land tenure often negatively impacted the forest management behavior of 
both communities and corporations. For one, as mentioned previously, the imposition of 
state-created village government systems over preexisting adat governance systems 
severely weakened adat institutions and reduced their ability to govern traditional forest 
management effectively. The establishment of concessionaires and transmigrants in 
forested areas created competition with local communities as well, and many of these 
communities then were forced to cultivate on vulnerable forestland or to shorten fallow 
periods. In response to these issues, the government introduced programs aimed at 
enhancing the engagement of local communities in forest management (Liu, Faure, and 
Mascini 2018). Two examples of these, forest certification schemes and community-
based forest management programs, will be discussed below. 
Forest certification schemes 
The Indonesian government’s forest certification schemes began in the 1990s, 
when international NGOs began organizing boycotts of unethically-sourced timber (Liu, 
Faure, and Mascini 2018, 40). Although initially the main purpose of forest certification 
was to discourage illegal logging and promote sustainable practices, it now often 
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emphasizes creating economic and social opportunities for local peoples as well (Harada 
and Wiyono 2014). Two voluntary certification organizations now exist: the Forest 
Stewardship Council (FSC) and the Indonesian Eco-label Institute (LEI). Each of these 
contain measures that require protections for indigenous peoples’ rights, and thus 
represent one method that the government has used to try to balance the interests of 
industry and local communities. It is important to note, as well, that although both LEI 
and FSC are voluntary, timber companies often face significant pressure to obtain 
certification. For example, Lowe’s, an American home improvement retail company, will 
purchase Bornean wood only if it has been FSC certified (Lowe's n.d.). 
Principles under the FSC, for example, specifically mention indigenous rights, 
prescribing that customary rights to own, use, and manage their land and resources must 
be respected, and that forest management must benefit local communities (Liu, Faure, 
and Mascini 2018). Further, the FSC was initially established, in part, as a remedy for 
some of the problems that community-based forest enterprises had faced when pursuing 
certification, which included high costs of auditing, assessment, and implementation 
(Harada and Wiyono 2014)  
Similarly, LEI’s certifications include standards for ecological and social 
sustainability, and require a community-based forest tenure system and that negative 
impacts on local communities must be minimized (Liu, Faure, and Mascini 2018, 43). 
Both LEI and FSC thus also set standards for community-based forest management 
programs, which will be discussed further in this chapter. In addition to these voluntary 
schemes, a mandatory certification program has been established under the Ministry of 
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Forestry. However, the program has been criticized for a lack of independence and 
transparency (Ibid, 41). 
Another issue has been an absence of effective certification bodies that monitor 
timber operations. International efforts to boycott timber that has been cut illegally have 
aimed to reduce such practices, but without proper certification bodies, these efforts often 
lack substance. For one, certification bodies sometimes issue certificates without proper 
assessment. For example, the Koalisi Anti Mafia Hutan (Anti Forest Mafia Coalition) 
found seven instances in which timber-processing companies in Papua New Guinea had 
been issuing licenses despite processing wood sourced from illegally logged forests 
(Syahni 2017). 
And, when this occurs, legal consequences for violations often are not carried out 
effectively. Little transparency exists regarding when these certification bodies, which are 
supervised by the National Accreditation Committee and the Ministry of Environment 
and Forestry, impose sanctions on timber companies for noncompliance (Cetera et al. 
2018). Further, in some instances, the Indonesian government has been severely criticized 
for its improper handling of offenses related to illegal logging. In one instance in 2014, 
Labora Sitorus, a Papuan police officer, received a light sentence of two years in prison 
and a fine of 50 million rupiah ($4250) for charges including money laundering and 
illegal timber smuggling (Montesori 2014). A statement from the Environmental 
Investigation Agency decried the case, saying it “highlights failings of [Indonesia’s] legal 
timber system.” (Environmental Investigation Agency 2014a). 
 Conflict has also stemmed from involvement of regional governments in illegally 
distributing forest resource extraction permits, which led to the Ministry of Forestry 
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attempting to recentralize power through a series of ministerial decrees in 2000, with 
regional governments continuing to issue such permits in spite of this through 2004 (Liu, 
Faure, and Mascini 2018, 38). Thus, decentralization and subsequent efforts at 
recentralization have been a recurring pattern. Again, ambiguity in the law is a 
contributing factor. In addition to this, the illegal distribution of forest permits has often 
encroached upon indigenous land. A case study of resulting conflicts between a 
plantation company and several Dayak communities will be discussed later in this 
chapter.  
However, because of an increasing desire for sustainably-sourced timber in 
markets in the EU, the US, and Australia, combined with a distrust for government 
regulation in developing countries, third-party legality verification systems has been 
created (Ibid.). One of these is the Timber Legality Assurance System (TLAS), which 
was established in 2009. In conjunction with this, in 2016 the government began issuing 
Forest Law Enforcement, Governance, and Trade timber export licenses. Licensed 
Indonesian timber now is able to enter the European Union with much more ease; 
conversely, non-licensed EU timber imports undergo a number of procedures to ensure 
that it is sustainably sourced (Cetera et al. 2018). Because the program is relatively 
recent, evidence of its effects is not yet available. However, some organizations, like the 
World Resources Institute, have reported instances of “timber laundering,” in which 
illegal timber is mixed in with legal timber, and both receive certification.  
Community-based forest management 
Legislation governing community-based forest management (CBFM) has also 
been passed, following the government’s recognition of customary forests in 1990. While 
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CBFM programs established under the Indonesian state do not grant ownership rights to 
local communities, they allow varying degrees of participation in forest management 
depending on the program. CBFM systems also necessarily vary with regard to the 
characteristics of local communities, which include what types of timber and non-timber 
products are extracted, as well as the degree of local communities’ dependency upon 
them.  
An important distinction relevant to CBFM and other community forestry 
programs, then, is one of access and property. This was described Ribot and Peluso 
(2003) in their “theory of access” outline. Issues unique to access represent, for the 
Dayaks, pivotal factors that have the potential to protect or constrain their livelihood 
strategies. Ribot and Peluso define access as “the ability to benefit from things—
including material objects, persons, institutions, and symbols,” and property as the “right 
to benefit from things.” Thus, the Indonesian government controls resource access 
through its ownership of forest property, while communities, like the Dayaks, must work 
through these institutions to maintain their access. One way in which this is achieved is 
through the implementation of CBFM programs, where rights to access are facilitated by 
the government, as the property owner and controller of access.  
Several policies exist in both private forests and state forests to support CBFM in 
Indonesia. Currently, all systems of community forestry are based on “core 
memberships” of local communities that were often marginalized and seen as inferior 
during the first few decades of forestry development following the 1970s (Sardjono and 
Imang 2015). These systems are also complicated. Legally, a number of different 
frameworks exist through which stakeholders may cooperate.  
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Indonesia has three main community-based forestry schemes: community forest 
(hutan kemasyaratkan) (HKm), private forest (hutan rakyat) (HR), and village forest 
(hutan desa) (HD). A number of legal arrangements surrounding CBFM now exists in 
Indonesia, but three are particularly relevant: The Village Forest, the Community Forest, 
and the People’s Timber Plantation. It is important to note, though, that these programs 
only cover state forest, and thus are not relevant to customary forest that now has been 
classified separately from state forest. However, the area of forest land that actually has 
been recognized through indigenous claims has been rather small1, and thus the reality is 
that many of the Dayaks continue to rely upon state forest land, and these programs 
therefore continue to maintain their relevance to Dayak livelihoods.  
The Village Forest (Hutan Desa) secures forest use access of local communities 
to forest resources. Again, it covers only state forest land, which is controlled by the 
national government. Under the program, forest management is carried out by village 
communities over a period of 35 years, with the possibility for a renewal covering the 
following 35 years pending the approval of a long term work plan (Sari 2013, 38). In 
addition, committees within the communities are responsible for regularly submitting 
both annual and long-term plans to the provincial governor to secure their user rights. 
Thus, the targets of the Village Forest exist at the village level. Because the other two 
main programs, the Community Forest and the People’s Timber Plantation focus 
primarily on community farmer’s groups, the Village Forest and its management by 
village institutions is most relevant for the Dayaks. The permits issued under the program 																																																								
1 President Jokowi’s promise to return 12.7 million hectares of land largely has been left 
unfulfilled; as of 2017, titles to only 1.9 million hectares of forest land had been 
distributed (Chandran 2018)  
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may cover both protection and production forests if no conflicting rights or permits for 
those areas exist, although the activities permitted differ depending on whether the forest 
land is classified for production or protection (De Royer, Van Noordwijk, and Roshetko 
2018, 170). For example, within a protection forest, only extraction of non-timber forest 
products is allowed, while in a production forest, communities may extract both timber 
and non-timber forest products.  
The Community Forest (Hutan Kemasyarakatan) is focused on promoting the 
welfare of communities living in and around forested areas by protecting their access to 
forest resources (Sari 2013). Unlike the Village Forest, only community farmers’ groups 
are eligible to apply for permits. However, the Community Forest program also applies to 
national forest land that has been classified as production or protection forest, as long as 
no conflicting permits exist. And, similar to the Village Forest, the types of activities that 
are permitted differ depending on the classification of the forest land as well; non-timber 
forest products may be extracted from both protection and production forest, but timber 
forest products may be extracted only from production forest (De Royer, Van Noordwijk, 
and Roshetko 2018, 170). Thus, Community Forest and Village Forest are very similar in 
their scope, and mainly differ in their target populations.  
The People’s Timber Plantation (Hutan Tanaman Rakyat) is aimed at accelerating 
economic growth by focusing primarily on increasing timber production for local 
communities, which, in theory, would reduce unemployment and poverty. Because the 
focus is on timber production, however, the program only applies to production forest.  
Similar to the Community Forest, the program is limited to community farmers’ groups.  
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As mentioned above, of the three programs, the Village Forest is most relevant to 
this thesis, first, because the Dayaks have participated significantly in the Village Forest 
program, and second, because research on its effectiveness exists. In Kalimantan, the land 
area classified as Village Forest has indeed been increasing. In 2012, around 144 square 
kilometers had been classified in Village Forest, but by 2016, this had risen to 1,195 
square kilometers (Santika et al. 2017, 62). However, in 2016, only 65 percent of Village 
Forest land that had been granted to communities in Kalimantan had been intact forest 
(with forest cover between 80 and 100 percent). Over 20 percent of the land granted had 
already been severely degraded (with forest cover less than 40 percent)(Ibid.). Thus, 
quality of the land, in addition to the quantity, is extremely important. Forest livelihoods 
are of course heavily impacted by the quality of the forest upon which they depend. In 
areas with severe forest degradation, the ability of local communities to reap the intended 
benefits of CBFM schemes is significantly limited.  
Regardless, the Village Forest program has been successful by some measures. 
One aim of community-based forest management schemes, generally, is to promote 
sustainable forest use. In Kalimantan, some research has demonstrated that the Village 
Forest program has indeed helped avoid deforestation, although its effectiveness in doing 
so has varied over different years and locations (Ibid.). However, significant issues also 
exist. These have included a lack of monitoring, particularly in areas that are not 
effectively managed, which has created opportunities for illegal logging. Another 
problem is that, for the Dayaks, the Village Forest program does not adequately consider 
the complexities of customary peoples’ claims (Fujiwara 2017). For one, the requirement 
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that a map of the requested land area be provided makes it difficult for communities 
experiencing conflicts over territory.  
As will be discussed in the case studies later in this chapter, such conflicts are 
particularly relevant in adat communities due to competition between groups with 
ancestral ties to land and groups that had been moved to that land for various reasons. 
Also important is the Village Forest program’s lack of emphasis on working alongside 
existing adat governance structures that often have long-established rules regulating the 
sharing of forest resources. This may worsen mistrust among communities and local 
governments, particularly because state law takes precedent in any instances where 
conflicts between state law and adat law exist.  
A study by Fujiwara (2017) found that following the establishment of Village 
Forest programs, some communities hurried to claim land use rights due to concern that 
private corporations would grab the land. This led to a lack of preparedness for many 
claims, where communities failed to reach agreements outlining Village Forest land and 
its boundaries among communities. Furthermore, in some cases, oil palm plantations 
were created on land that had already been approved for incorporation into the Village 
Forest Program, which both affirmed and intensified already-existing fears that 
corporations would seize land. Again, a significant issue is ambiguity. Generally, even 
when permit requests are submitted, the process by which they are approved often is 
extremely slow. The process of applying for permits also lacks accessibility, as many 
communities are unaware of how to apply. However, the government has made efforts to 
streamline the process. For example, a two-year moratorium was implemented in 2011 on 
licenses for primary natural forests in order to create time to undertake forest governance 
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reforms (Austin et al. 2014). It has since been extended three times, and is now expended 
to end in 2019 (Munthe and Jensen 2017).   
 Regardless, in part because of these problems, alongside perceived low financial 
benefits from local management, some communities in West Kalimantan have preferred 
private industry work (Langston et al. 2017). Thus, a significant issue in CBFM programs 
in Kalimantan has been the continued presence of poverty for communities reliant on 
forest resources, difficulties in securing access to such resources, and profitable 
alternatives to convert forest land. Economic factors, then, may in some cases be 
attractive enough to outweigh the potential benefits of local management and its 
relationship with adat customs and increased conservation.  
In addition, CBFM may consist of other agreements between private companies 
and local communities (company-community partnerships), or between conservation 
offices and local communities (Collaborative Conservation Management) (Liu, Faure, 
and Mascini 2018, 39). Company-community partnerships have been implemented in 
cases where, for example, a company is granted a concession for a timber plantation 
where community members had claimed ownership, creating conflicts. In some cases, 
community members might grow trees in partnership with private companies, and, in 
return, receive a share of the profits (Nawir and Santoso 2005). Collaborative 
Conservation Management, while often centered around conservation offices and local 
communities, may also involve a multitude of stakeholders, including NGOs and other 
government structures. However, the bargaining power of local communities is often 
weak in comparison to that of companies and conservation offices, and thus, the rights of 
these communities can remain limited (Ibid.).  
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Furthermore, some forest certification schemes now include provisions that 
encourage CBFM.  The FSC, for one, has a community-based forest management scheme 
that is also targeted at local communities, by allowing community producers to form 
management units and apply for a single FSC certificate. While forest certification 
schemes were once perceived negatively by some small or non-industrial operations, 
partly due to concern over negative economic consequences and rising costs, these 
smaller operations in recent years increasingly have been involved in forest certification 
schemes (Maryudi et al. 2017) .  And, forest certification schemes may improve local 
peoples’ perceptions towards conserving forests and its potential financial benefits 
(Harada and Wiyono 2014).  
Case studies 
While the government has referenced adat communities extensively in its legal 
frameworks, in practice, little has been accomplished. One could be a perception that by 
affording indigenous communities special protections and exclusive rights to natural 
resources, revenue from resource extraction by larger corporations will fall. Another 
issue is oversight. Indonesia’s monitoring and enforcement systems have remained weak, 
and, combined with an ineffective judicial system, when indigenous land rights have been 
violated, there has been little recourse (McCarthy and Robinson 2016). As will be 
demonstrated below, this is intensified when the law is ambiguous. One of Elinor 
Ostrom’s (1999) principles important to long-enduring common-pool resources 
institutions, as discussed in Chapter Three, is that the resource should have clearly 
defined boundaries. The lack of clearly defined boundaries, here, severely hampers the 
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ability of local communities to manage their resources effectively. This section will 
discuss barriers to indigenous claims in six case studies. 
The first three case studies, from Central Kalimantan, Lombok province, and 
West Sinjai, demonstrate issues of corruption and ambiguity in the law, as well as the 
challenge governments face in balancing the interests of industry and local communities. 
Another issue is the assumption that communities are unitary in their desire to assert 
indigenous identity; because indigenous claims are recognized at the community level, 
the reluctance of some members may hinder the claims of others. 
The fourth and fifth case study, from North Kalimantan and West Kalimantan, 
both pertain to challenges in claiming indigeneity to gain land tenure. As will be 
discussed below, a significant issue is how definitions of indigeneity based on historical 
ties to a particular tract of land can lead to intensified land conflicts between indigenous 
groups. The problem is complicated, for one, by the fact that many indigenous groups 
throughout Kalimantan have remained quite mobile, which severely weakens land claims 
for some. Finally, the sixth case, from Indonesian Papua, will show the Indonesian 
government’s impulse to retain control in the face of strengthening adat institutions.  
Case Study: Gunung Mas, Central Kalimantan 
 In one instance, reported by the Environmental Investigation Agency in 2012, 
Dayaks from nine Central Kalimantese villages in a formal letter to the sub-district 
government rejected the proposal of an oil palm concession, and later attended meetings 
with the regency and provincial government, reaffirming their objections (Environmental 
Investigation Agency 2014b). The regency then reviewed the case and issued an 
instruction banning the annexation of the forest on the basis that the communities held 
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land rights there. The regency then instructed the company to map tenure claims within 
the concession. Indigenous land within the concession was divided into individual land 
and communally-owned land.  
Subsequently, one Dayak community leader reported being offered a bribe from 
the company for cooperation in establishing the oil palm concession. When he refused, 
company representatives then asked community members to mark out the locations of 
their holdings and then paid a flat rate per hectare. The company, however, had failed to 
properly consider community land, and many community members sold much of their 
communal land, even though the sale of community land also had been prohibited by the 
regency government. Two months later, a third party was issued a permit to extract nearly 
60,000 cubic meters of timber from within the concession. Thus, even though the 
community had followed procedure in objecting to the proposal of the concession, 
bribery, corruption, and ambiguity resulted in the issuing of the concession regardless. 
This led to a loss of communal land, upon which Dayak livelihoods often rely heavily.  
Case study: Rempek Village, Lombok 
 While located outside of Kalimantan, a case study of land tenure conflicts in 
Lombok, an island West of Bali, illustrates issues of ambiguity in the law, corruption, and 
the failure of government authorities to adequately address these conflicts, probably 
because they were often involved in corrupt activities themselves. This case study draws 
from the research of Langston et al. (2017), who studied Rempek village and its tenure 
conflicts extensively.  
Land ownership in Rempek has remained ambiguous since the first half of the 
twentieth century, when the Dutch colonial authority demarcated forest boundaries and 
		
74	
74	
allowed farmers to cultivate land on its outer edges. Later, after Indonesian 
independence, the Forest Agency established its own official forest borders in 1957, and 
there was little dispute over these until the 1980s, when the district office began 
permitting villagers to cultivate one square hectare of production forest per individual. It 
is important to note that this permission granted land use, and not ownership. In 1984, 
however, as part of the National Land Certification Scheme, land ownership certificates 
within the area were distributed, and their recipients were district and sub-district 
officials. Five years later, the government retracted its program that had allowed villagers 
to plant within the production forest, thus creating significant conflict with local 
communities, which refused to leave. 
In 1991, the National Land Agency undertook a mapping and surveying project, 
which suggested that the land, in actuality, belonged outside the forested area that was 
under the ownership of the Ministry of Forestry, and thus belonged to the local 
government instead. Nonetheless, the central government responded by issuing 
concessions to a timber company to begin extracting timber within the area of dispute. 
Conflict escalated, as villagers became emboldened by the support of the National Land 
Agency and national NGOs. Efforts to establish community forestry projects later were 
made by NGOs, but failed, as they did not address the boundary issues and thus 
community members refused to accept the projects. Finally, in 2012, the NGO Samanta, 
along with community members, established a community-based forest management 
scheme. While members now receive user rights, the conflict is not yet resolved, from 
their perspective, as land certifications have not yet been issued.    
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The conflicts resulting from poorly defined land tenure in Rempek have had a 
number of negative impacts on villagers. State forest in particular often lacks adequate 
infrastructure, and thus roads are poorly maintained, making it difficult for children to get 
to school, electricity is not supplied, and houses are ill-constructed. While the land claims 
in Rempek do not have a customary basis, the villagers face similar issues that customary 
communities do. Ambiguity in the law often leads to a distrust in government and can be 
serious limitations to improving the livelihoods of local villagers, particularly in 
scenarios when their livelihoods depend upon the conflicted land. Although natural 
resource extraction is often justified in the name of national interested, as demonstrated in 
this case, the negative impacts clearly affect some groups much more than others.  
Case study: Turungan, West Sinjai 
 
 Conflicts between the national and regional governments are another potential 
problem. One case documented by De Muur (2018) demonstrates first, a lack of cohesion 
between the judiciary and the regional and local governments, and second, that a diverse 
range of interests exists, even within a customary community that may appear to be 
unitary to outside observers.   
 West Sinjai has experienced significant conflict land ownership conflicts between 
the regional government and local communities since the mid-1990s. Many villagers in 
West Sinjai live on state forestland and cultivate rice, coffee, and cloves. Some farmers 
have suggested, though, that during the colonial era, the land was recognized as 
community forest. Between 2009 and 2015 the regional forestry department arrested and 
charged 15 local farmers with illegal logging in a state forest. In response, student 
activists asserted that the arrests were motivated, in part, by regional government 
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officials’ interests in receiving annual reforestation funds from the central government. 
These arrests, the activists argued, were used to demonstrate to the central government 
that these reforestation funds were indeed necessary to rehabilitate forests that had been 
degraded by local communities.  
 One farmer in particular, named Bahtiar, was encouraged by local activists and 
AMAN to register his village community as a member of AMAN, which would entitle it 
to AMAN’s legal services. In order to do so, though, he needed to prove that his 
community indeed fit the legal definition of adat communities, which requires the 
existence of adat laws, adat institutions, and a communal adat territory. According to 
Bahtiar, his community easily met these requirements.  
 Although national legislation recognizing adat communities has been passed, 
regional legislation has been lacking. Student activists had for years pushed for the 
passage of regional legislation, but this was hampered by a lack of connections with 
influential local officials. This was partly due to reluctance from some village members 
to politicize their indigenous identity. Some members believed that customary rules and 
institutions should be kept within the community, and thus were not interested in using 
indigeneity as a means to claim land use rights. Thus, it is important while indigenous 
status is applied to entire communities, members of these communities may have 
interests that conflict with one another.  In addition to this problem, officials from the 
regional forestry department also believed that although communities in the area claimed 
to be indigenous, they in fact were not, and were motivated only by the prospect of 
obtaining more land. 
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 The failure of the provincial government to recognize Bahtiar’s adat rights 
ultimately led to his conviction for illegal logging. In the end, the court ruled that adat 
communities may only be recognized in court when they have already been recognized 
by district regulations. Because the provincial government had not recognized the 
community as indigenous, it was found that Bahtiar had no right to cultivate the land. 
This also suggests that it is not the responsibility of the judiciary, but instead of regional 
and local governments, to recognize adat communities.  
Case study: Malinau, North Kalimantan 
One case, mentioned earlier in this chapter, demonstrates the conflicts that may 
arise from tenure claims that rely on definitions of indigeneity based on territoriality and 
a history of occupation of that land. As is the case for many Dayak groups, history of use 
and adat law constitute central bases for tenure claims in Malinau, a region of North 
Kalimantan. Wollenberg, Moeliono and Limberg (2009) extensively studied conflicting 
claims put forth by a number of groups, all indigenous to Kalimantan, although with 
varying degrees of historical ties to Malinau. One group, the Kenyah, originally from 
Pujungan, settled in Malinau with the permission of the customary head of the Langap, a 
nearby village, in 1972. A decade later, the government resettled two Punan communities 
in the same area. Around the same time, a Merap group from the Sengayan River also 
moved to the area, resulting in four Dayak communities living nearby one another in 
Malinau. Agreements on land use were made among one another based on adat law, as 
well as with the nearby Langap village.  
Little conflict existed between the four Dayak groups before commercial forest 
clearing began in the areas, which opened up the forest for small-scale exploitation. Two 
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of the groups, the Merap and the Kenyah, thus put forth land claims; the Merap claimed 
they were the oldest settlers and the Kenyah emphasized their agreements with the 
Langap village. Neither Punan communities had strong claims.  The potential financial 
benefits in compensation payments and fees led to a race in claiming forestland based on 
adat.  
This case study also demonstrates the processes through which adat rights are 
recognized by the state. As mentioned previously, an independent committee of experts 
first must verify that a number of criteria have been met. These criteria require that adat 
law is still practiced, adat institutions still exist, territorial boundaries are clear, and the 
communities continue to be reliant on forest resources. The continued existence of adat 
law and its institutions tend to be more difficult to prove. Before the large-scale 
exploitation of forest resources in Malinau began, for instance, the lack of conflict 
between adjacent communities meant that there was little need for members to seek out 
formal institutions for conflict resolution. Instead, disputes generally were settled through 
informally by adat leaders, and thus little documentation exist. Further, since 
Wollenberg, Moeliono, and Limberg’s research, the Punan had only recently begun 
writing down their adat laws and history, and thus, in some ways, had an advantage in 
that they were able to “construct” history to better fit their claims. The Kenyah and the 
Merap, by comparison, had written their adat laws as early as 1968. Some interpretations 
of history, in the end, further led to conflicts, though, as families from some communities 
have claimed larger tracts of land based on asserted familial ties with past sultans.    
Regardless, a major issue surrounding adat claims in Malinau has surrounded a 
history of migration combined with settlements sponsored by the government, which has 
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led to the establishment of four communities, all indigenous to Kalimantan, in one area. 
While inland groups like the Kenyah were often more territorial, their territories were not 
always permanent. Further, coastal groups like the Punan, which depended more heavily 
on trade, were even more mobile. Again, claims that rely on historical attachment to 
given areas remove bases for claims from groups recently settled in an area, including 
communities that had been resettled by the government in the 1960s and 1970s. At the 
time of the study, some Punan groups had moved from Malinau and returned to their 
ancestral territories. The Punan, further, historically had remained quite scattered in small 
groups, which even further weakens their claims to land tenure. Thus, while claims based 
on historical presence are beneficial to some, they have the potential to severely constrain 
sources of livelihood for potentially equally deserving others. The government has also 
been reluctant to interfere when conflicts have arisen, creating anxiety for communities 
with weaker claims that increasingly lack economic security.  
Case study: Kapuas, West Kalimantan 
The following case study, from Kapuas, West Kalimantan, will further illustrate 
some of the issues related to indigenous claims to land tenure based on territory and prior 
occupation. Specifically, such definitions of indigeneity often fail to acknowledge that 
virtually all ethnic groups have been migrants at some point, and the Dayaks have been 
particularly mobile.  
This case study draws from the field work of De Royer et al. (2015), who studied 
two villages in West Kalimantan. The first village, Manua Sadap, has been occupied by 
Iban Dayak communities, while the second, Pulau Manak, has been occupied by 
Embaloh Dayak communities.  
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The Iban Dayaks are spread throughout northwestern Borneo, although their West 
Kalimantantese population is relatively small compared to their population across the 
Indonesian-Malaysian border, in Sarawak. Their migration from the up-river Iban region 
in Sarawak began in the late 19th Century. The Embaloh Dayak communities, by contrast, 
have been established in the area for at least twenty generations, and describe themselves 
as the original inhabitants of the region. Both communities share Dayak cultural 
practices; at the time of the study, many inhabited longhouses and practiced swidden 
cultivation. However, both communities in recent years have experienced heightened 
competition for land, which, accompanied by increased use of fertilizers and pesticides, 
has forced communities to adapt their agricultural practices and cultivate fewer plots. 
Non-farming employment was extremely low throughout the region, so both 
communities further heavily relied on forest products as secondary sources of livelihoods. 
This reliance has intensified conflicts, as both communities are dependent on access to 
forests.  
 Historically, little conflict existed between the two groups. The Iban occupied 
upstream, uninhabited areas of mature forest that had been unoccupied by the Embaloh 
Dayaks, who settled in the lowlands near the Embaloh river. The relationship between 
these two communities, further, was established through adat procedures, covering the 
border between the two communities, river resources, and common forest properties. 
Adat law was also used as the primary system of village governance within each of the 
two communities.  
The introduction of a UNREDD+ pilot program in the area intensified arguments 
over forest boundaries and resource ownership, due to the program’s possible financial 
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benefits. Because of this, both groups constructed historical claims to tenure. The 
Embaloh asserted that because the Iban were relatively recent arrivals, the Embaloh 
themselves were the legitimate owners. The Iban argued, on the other hand, that they 
deserved land ownership and recognition because of their assistance to the Embaloh 
during conflicts with Melayu groups.  These conflicts led to the abandonment of some 
previous adat agreements, which outlined, for example, shared ownership of a tract of 
mature forest. In addition, definitions of indigeneity under UNREDD+, which link land 
tenure claims to a historical occupancy of land, runs the risk of excluding particular 
indigenous groups like the Embaloh. As Li (2007) notes, definitions relying on 
geographic boundaries often restrict claims to isolated communities. Recognition that 
customary land is often fluid and changing, instead, would broaden conceptions of 
indigeneity, and recognize the diversity of Dayak groups and their often competing 
interests.  
Case Study: Indonesian Papua  
  
 A recurring pattern for the Indonesian government has been one of releasing and 
reclaiming control. When the government decentralized after the fall of Suharto, for 
example, provincial governments began distributing forest concessions at alarming rates, 
prompting the national government to recentralize some of its control in forestry (Liu, 
Faure, and Mascini 2018, 38). In Papua, alongside of Indonesian decentralization more 
generally, were demands for Papuan independence, which prompted the central 
government to grant the province special autonomy status. This has led to 
decentralization laws in Papua and the province’s subsequent rise in the strength of its 
adat institutions (Muhammad 2013). While outside of Kalimantan, the Papuan case 
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illustrates the government’s desire to maintain control and its attempts to balance this 
control with the increasing strength of indigenous movements. However, the Papuan case 
has been intensified by threats from these secessionist movements, which perhaps 
explains the government’s willingness to undertake more drastic measures in retaining 
control (Ibid.).  
Nonetheless, the passage of the Special Autonomy Law facilitated the establishment 
of the Papua Customary Council (Dewan Adat Papua), which claims to represent more 
than 300 tribes in Papua. The Council has been praised for its strong democratic 
legitimacy and pushing for the right to a livelihood, with an emphasis on customary land 
tenure (Kayoi, Wells, and Shepherd 2008, 172). Yet, the Council has also repeatedly 
criticized the Indonesian government, claiming, in a 2010 report submitted to the United 
Nations Human Rights Council, that “human rights abuses by the state including 
violations of the rights of Indigenous People”, that “there is no freedom of expression and 
that the situation is steadily worsening in Papua”, and that “West Papuans2 are being 
jailed, tortured, and killed for peacefully expressing their political opinion and desire for 
decolonization and self-determination” (Papua Customary Council 2010). In response, 
the government has refused to recognize the Council, leading to a lack of implementation 
of concrete programs for Papuans (Dewi 2017).   
Maryudi et al. (2017) reports that instead, the Indonesian government in 2010 created 
the Papuan Customary Deliberative Assembly (Lembaga Musyawarah Adat), using the 
																																																								
2 Papua refers to the Indonesian part of New Guinea, on the west side of the island. West 
Papua and the province of Papua are distinct; West Papua separated from the province of 
Papua in 2003, although the Papua Customary Council represents indigenous groups in 
both provinces.  
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name of a past institution that opposed the central government in the 1990s. The new 
Papuan Customary Deliberative Assembly, established with the support of the national 
government’s Coordinating Ministry of Political, Legal, and Security Affairs, has tried to 
remove the influence of the Papua Customary Council and increase support for the 
central government’s own institution. While it has attempted to work at a grassroots 
level, however, it has not garnered much popular support.  
Another issue, according to Dewi (2010), is that under Papua’s Special Autonomy 
Law, every policy implemented in Papua must first be approved by adat institutions. The 
central government may then use the Papuan Customary Deliberative Assembly to 
approve unilaterally any policies it desires. For example, the Papuan Customary 
Deliberative Assembly has been brokering land to draw in foreign investments. This, 
however, has come at the cost of overriding the village adat heads. In doing so, the 
government has created the Papuan Customary Deliberative Assembly as its own adat 
“proxy” institution to promote its own interests in Papuan development.  
Government efforts to reclaim control from indigenous institutions in Papua are more 
severe than in Kalimantan; it is likely that its behavior has been motivated, in large part, 
by a perceived overstep from the Papuan Customary Council in criticizing the 
government. Yet, the Papuan case does illustrate the trend in Indonesia of the rise in adat 
institutions and the government’s general impulse to retain control. This may then help 
explain why legislation like the Draft Bill on the Recognition and Protection of the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples has so far failed to pass; that is, one concern is that the 
government’s increasing support of indigenous rights is largely symbolic. Current 
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President Jokowi, for example, has been repeatedly criticized by AMAN for his lack of 
action on indigenous issues (Nugroho 2019).   
Ostrom’s (1999) principles on common pool resource management call for autonomy; 
that is, that government authorities should not infringe upon the rights of users to 
establish their own institutions. The Indonesian government’s interventions, then, may 
hamper the abilities of adat institutions under the Papuan Customary Council to manage 
their forests in an effective manner. 
Concerns  
 Valid concerns regarding creating avenues for forest tenure claims, however, have 
also been raised. While the establishment and growth of large corporations clearly has 
had negative impacts, positive impacts also exist. The government’s concern with 
developing the national economy reflects this. The growth of industry is often associated 
with the stimulation of local economies. This was the case, for example, in the industrial 
revolution of the United States, where the exploitation of natural resources fueled the 
immense speed with which the American economy flourished (Klein 2012).  
Natural resource-intensive industries may also promote the growth of 
transportation infrastructure and can create new venues for isolated populations to gain 
access to resources like education and healthcare, both of which have great potential to 
improve quality of life and social mobility. During the New Order, for example, logging 
companies were often legally required to construct health and social facilities for local 
communities (Tanasaldy 1981, 185). While, in theory, this should have had many 
benefits for these communities, corruption of government officials and logging 
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operations severely hampered the potential benefits (Ibid.). Thus, despite a requirement 
for corporations to create social facilities, this was often not the case in practice.   
On one hand, diversification of livelihoods, which for the Dayaks often relies on 
access to forest resources, has a safety net function. Indeed, some research has attributed 
livelihood diversification to helping families escape extreme poverty internationally 
(Asfaw et al. 2015; Rist, Feintrenie, and Levang 2010; Ellis 1998). As described above, 
many Dayaks rely on subsistence farming, often consisting of swidden agriculture, as 
well as forest products and some non-farm work, which helps protect against the potential 
volatilities of resource availability. On the other hand, other research has noted that other, 
more specialized occupations, like those created by oil palm plantations and larger 
industries, have greater poverty alleviation potential. This is particularly true in measures 
of health care, education, and infrastructure (Rival and Levang 2014, 20; Gönner 2017, 
48). For these reasons, many rural indigenous households now prefer occupations in 
larger industries over farming and traditional forest use (Rival and Levang 2014). It is 
also important to note, though, that historically, in many cases, industry has not provided 
stable, long-term jobs for local populations. In Western Kalimantan, often the majority of 
skilled-workers in plantations are not locals (Alqadrie 1990). Locals are also sometimes 
perceived as uneducated, more difficult to deal with, and lacking the specific skills 
needed by plantation operations (Tanasaldy 2012, 188).  
Regardless, this has contributed to two different “moral economies” (Lounela 
2017). On one hand, subsistence farming traditionally has encouraged a collectivist 
orientation, where the emphasis has been on subsistence and the sharing of products 
within communities. In opposition to this has been a shift to market dependency, where 
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some now generate income from larger industries like the rubber economy. Changing 
cultural values, then, is one effect. Gönner (2017) describes a dichotomy of the expansion 
of oil palm and coal mining operations pushing and pulling livelihoods away from and 
towards subsistence farming. The first scenario, the “push” of declining resources 
availabilities, has been the primary focus of this chapter. It is concerned with issues 
preventing some indigenous communities from accessing forest resources upon which 
their livelihoods depend. The effect is that many turn to occupational opportunities 
afforded by larger industries. The second scenario, the “pull” of industry and its potential 
economic benefits, emphasizes the attraction, especially for many young people, of more 
modern lifestyles that traditional agricultural practices simply cannot provide.  
 Whether or not industry has truly been beneficial to Kalimantese indigenous 
peoples,  
 it is therefore important to emphasize the diversity of indigenous interests. Even outside 
of economic interests, consider, again, the case study in West Sinjai. Some older village 
members preferred not to register their community as indigenous because although they 
identified as indigenous, they believed that their indigenous practices belonged within the 
village, and should not have been exposed to outsiders (Van Der Muur 2018).   
Regardless, the political climate borne out of reformasi has brought with it a 
proliferation of identity politics and heightened demands for community control over 
customary land and resources. One effect has been increased tensions among ethnic 
groups. This has included conflict between Dayak and non-Dayak groups, such as Dayak 
violence against the resettled Madurese in the 1990s, described in Chapter Two, as well 
as conflict within Dayak groups, such as the above-mentioned conflicting claims between 
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the Punan and the Kenyah in the Malinau region (Larrabure and Moeliono 2013). While 
cultural identity for the Dayaks has long been political, this has become particularly 
salient after the Constitutional Court in 2013 ruled requiring indigenous land claims to be 
accompanied by the existence of adat institutions and other adat-related criteria 
described above. 
Assertions of indigenous identity, then, have become inextricably linked to 
decentralization, as indigenous communities have emerged as powerful interest groups in 
the realm of Indonesian politics. AMAN, for example, played a pivotal role in supporting 
the passage of the 2013 Constitutional Court decision and then by exerting pressure on 
President Jokowi to pass pending legislation in accordance with the Court decision. 
AMAN, as a representative of a large voter base, is also likely to impact the April 2019 
election cycle. However, an AMAN representative in February 2019 stated, “There is no 
strong reason for choosing Jokowi since six out of the nine development programs he has 
promised have not yet materialized. There is no reason to choose Prabowo either since he 
has never brought up indigenous people’s issues” (Nugroho 2019). The prioritizing of 
indigenous interests in these campaigns, or lack thereof, may be an important signifier of 
the future direction of indigenous tenure rights, particularly because criticisms of current 
President Jokowi include his failure to fulfill his own campaign promises of pushing for 
the passage of the Draft Bill on the Recognition and Protection of the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples (Ibid.).  
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Chapter 5: Recommendations 
 To summarize, a fundamental concern for the Dayaks is one of claims to forest 
land. Fujiwara (2017), drawing from a diverse body of literature outlining the challenges 
that communities face in gaining resource access, identifies three broad categories: 
regulatory procedures, roles among actors, and resources. The Dayaks, unfortunately, 
have faced all three challenges. Because the Dayaks as an indigenous group also face 
issues of defining indigeneity in addition to these challenges, such issues will be 
discussed as well. Thus, this chapter will be structured into these categories, and 
recommendations will be suggested within each. 
Regulatory procedures 
 Within barriers created by regulatory procedures is the critical issue of 
ambiguities in the law, which has been a common theme throughout this thesis. It 
hampers the ability of communities, first, to obtain recognition of their indigenous status, 
and second, to benefit from the rights that should follow in theory.   
 The first issue is related directly to Indonesian law, as decisions made regarding 
why some groups are granted status yet others are denied is oftentimes unclear. Even 
definitions of indigenity, to start, are ambiguous and are a source of contention. For one, 
conceptions of indigeneity put forth by intergovernmental organizations, such as in the 
2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, emphasize historical ties to a 
particular tract of land, yet in Indonesia, the reality is that many West Kalimantese 
indigenous groups have been rather mobile. Uncertainty in how to define indigineity, 
further, can be a difficult issue for the government as well as for indigenous peoples. 
Even when the government is well-intentioned, it is extremely difficult to identify what 
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tracts of land ought to be granted to which groups, particularly because mobility is a 
necessary component of livelihood strategies for many Dayak groups.  
 With regard to the second issue, ambiguity may also lead to anxieties from 
indigenous communities in securing their land rights, which in some cases has created 
competitive environments where groups scramble to apply for land without being fully 
prepared for the application process. And, the lack of preparedness has sometimes led to 
the rejection of such rights claims.  In other cases, even some communities that had their 
claims recognized later found that the government allowed oil palm plantations to be 
constructed on their land (Fujiwara 2017).  
 A possible explanation is the impulse of the Indonesian government to retain 
control. Shlager and Ostrom (1992) describe the necessity for governments to protect the 
rights of local users to manage their resources. Yet, ambiguity in some cases may be used 
as a tool for governments to retain power. The Supreme Court’s 2013 recognition of 
indigenous land as distinct from state land and the Indonesian House of Representatives’ 
subsequent failure to pass concrete legislation enforcing the decision is one example 
among many (Rogers 2016). Ambiguity allows the government a degree of flexibility in 
the law’s invocation, and while decentralization has indeed increased decision-making 
power among local communities, ambiguity has remained a critical issue, as national, 
provincial, and local governments often are not equally informed.  
 One means to address the government’s tendency to maintain control is through 
the co-management of resources in community forestry, wherein both the government 
and the community would share power. This has been the focus of many community 
forestry efforts, and in Indonesia this often takes the form of community access rights on 
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state-owned land. Indeed, formal CBFM systems in Indonesia, like the Village Forest, 
exist in state forest and thus deal with access, and not ownership. On one hand, co-
management of forests has been quite effective in some cases in Indonesia (Bock 2012). 
For the Indonesian government, co-management can be particularly attractive because it 
allows local communities to participate in forest governance, yet some state-control can 
be maintained. On the other, though any improvements in such systems surely would be 
valuable, one concern is that the existence of such systems could be used as a means to 
justify government retention of customary lands. Because communities already have 
access, it then becomes easier to deemphasize the need for customary ownership.  
 Of course, claiming indigeneity for customary land rights is a separate matter. The 
current state of affairs in Indonesia is that, in actuality, a relatively small area of land 
ownership has been granted to indigenous communities. Thus, many communities 
continue to rely on community-based forest management systems that focus on access 
rather than ownership. While ideally, passing legislation that more concretely affirms the 
rights of indigenous people to customary land ownership would remove issues of access 
to government-owned land, improving and protecting such access in instances where 
ownership has not yet been granted is also necessary.  
Interactions among actors 
 Problems of interactions, for the Dayaks, are related to feelings of distrust among 
communities and governments at different levels, which often are fueled by difficulties in 
negotiating an intricate, often corrupt, political system. Decentralization, again, has 
complicated the issue further. In some cases, the interests of different layers of 
government have been openly at odds with one another. One example is the Ministry of 
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Forestry’s 2000 decision to recentralize control on the issuing process of forest extraction 
permits and provincial governments continuing to issue the permits in spite of this, 
leading to serious forest degradation (Liu, Faure, and Mascini 2018). Regional 
governments profited from the sales of these permits, much to the chagrin of the Ministry 
of Forestry, which had recentralized, in part, to aid in natural resource conservation. In 
other cases, the issue has been a lack of communication, which sometimes led to officials 
simply not knowing about certain programs. This was indeed the case with the 
establishment of a 2014 moratorium on issuing new licenses to convert primary forests 
and peatland, where often lack of enforcement was due local officials not knowing about 
the moratorium (Austin et al. 2014). 
 Corruption represents yet another problem, and likely is a significant contributor 
to general feelings of distrust between indigenous communities and governments at all 
levels. In the same instance, mentioned in the previous paragraph, where provincial 
governments continued to issue forest extraction permits despite the Ministry of 
Forestry’s prohibitions, a chief motivator was corruption—some officials directly 
profited from the corrupt distribution of such permits to logging concessionaires (Hohne 
et al. 2018). Ostrom’s (1999) second principle on common pool resource management, 
then, which asserts that participants must perceive the rules assigning benefits and the 
rules assigning costs as fair, is directly inhibited by such corruption and the mistrust of 
officials that it breeds.  
 One solution might be the introduction of effective mediators with the capacity to 
facilitate political negotiations with which indigenous groups often lack experience. A 
critical part of building back trust from local people is communication, or what Brown et 
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al. (2002) has dubbed, “turning ‘participation’ into ‘citizenship’”, where community 
members perceive themselves as active stewards of forest resources, rather than passive 
participants in their extraction. Hopefully, the presence of mediators would also help 
reduce corruption, as increased monitoring as well as knowledge of application 
processes, in theory, should work to deter resource misuse.  
 Yet, at the same time, some evidence suggests that increased numbers of 
mediators do not necessarily lead to increased recognition of indigenous land rights 
claims (Lane 2002). Thus, not only is the existence of mediators important, but also their 
quality. A number of different organizations in the past have provided mediation 
effectively; indeed, NGOs and organizations like the United Nations Development 
Program have provided capacity-building services in social forestry programs with some 
success (Danks and Jungwirth 1990; Kleine 2009; Rawlani and Sovacool 2011). It is 
important to note though, that in order for management to be facilitated, indigenous 
communities must first be provided with secure rights. Thus, AMAN, the primary NGO 
representing indigenous peoples’ interests in Indonesia, has been involved heavily in 
advocating for the recognition of customary land, which of course is fundamentally 
necessary for obtaining land ownership to start.    
 Also related to mistrust of actors has been increasing suppression of political 
dissent in recent years. In February of 2019, a group of United Nations from the Human 
Rights Council called for investigations into multiple cases of alleged killings and illegal 
arrests of indigenous Papuans, in response to an online video of a young indigenous 
Papuan handcuffed, with a snake wrapped around him, during a police interrogation 
(Raavad 2019). Representatives of the Indonesian police force have since apologized, but 
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this represents, as described by the UN, “tactics… often used against indigenous Papuans 
and human rights defenders… symptomatic of the deeply entrenched discrimination and 
racism that indigenous Papuans face, including by Indonesian military and police” (Ibid.). 
 This particular case is more extreme than what has been observed in Kalimantan 
generally, but it nonetheless represents significant barriers that indigenous groups 
continue to face. Furthermore, suppression of dissent is still felt strongly by the Dayaks; 
one leader attending a conference on indigenous rights in March of 2016 stated, “we did 
all we could to protect the forests. We tried to seek help from local government but 
instead were blamed, captured, criminalized for defending out own lands” (Satriasanti 
2016). Even minor voicings of dissent increasingly have faced punishment: in March of 
2019 a university professor was sentenced to four years in prison for singing an old anti-
army song at a rally in Jakarta (Paddock 2019).  One concern, then, is that criticisms 
against the government could lead to repercussions that might include, in addition to 
unfair arrests and alleged killings, revoking access, particularly if indigenous groups are 
perceived as noncompliant.  
Resources 
 A lack of resources has been another barrier to recognizing Dayak customary land 
claims. Often this has included a lack of knowledge necessary for navigating processes 
like permit applications, which is worsened by the changing nature of Indonesian forestry 
policy that can make it difficult to remain up to date.  A researcher at the Center for 
International Forestry Research (CIFOR) aptly summarized the issue: “One of the major 
challenges causing slow forest tenure reforms is the lack of knowledge of people on the 
ground on its legal aspects and stages of the reform process” (Shahab 2018). An example 
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of this is the requirement for formal documentation for indigenous status applications. 
Groups that began this documentation process more recently, with knowledge of the 
criteria that must be met, thus are able to report history to their advantage (De Royer et 
al. 2015). Because this knowledge is so important, then, capacity-building is a promising 
option, where technical experts provided by NGOs or other or organizations may support 
communities in maximizing the strength of their claims. Capacity-building indeed has 
helped realize community welfare in Indonesian social forestry systems (Pujo et al. 
2018), although it is important that the unique situation of the Dayaks are recognized. 
This has been a significant pitfall of current CBFM systems, like the Village Forest, in 
their effectiveness for indigenous peoples.  
 The government has indeed made efforts to streamline access to programs like the 
Village Forest, which, with support from organizations like CIFOR shortened its 
application procedure time from between two and three years to between 24 and 37 days 
(Shahab 2018). In conjunction with this, CIFOR also released a guidebook to aid both 
local communities and implementing agencies in navigating the different phases of 
applications for CBFM schemes. Similar support for indigenous communities seeking to 
apply for indigenous status recognition, then, might be an effective option.  
 In addition to a lack of resources at the community level, a lack of resources at the 
subnational government level also exists. Generally, the capacity of subnational 
governments in Indonesia has remained low; infrastructure and economic strength remain 
concentrated in economic capitals, and lobbying for funds from Jakarta continues to be a 
common strategy, despite improvements from decentralization (Wollenberg, Moeliono, 
and Limberg 2009, 283). In addition, Indonesian government system was, in many ways, 
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simply unprepared for the speed with which decentralization occurred. Following 
decentralization, the majority of officials had had little or no experience with local 
government, and while many found the ideas of democracy appealing, they lacked 
knowledge on how to employ these ideas in practice (Ibid.). All of this resulted in the 
overlapping and often overly complex system that has been particularly difficult to 
navigate for indigenous communities. Up until the fall of Suharto, the Dayaks as a group 
had remained, for the most part, excluded from politics, and thus also had little 
experience in navigating political systems as well. Many of those initially excited by 
decentralization returned to their old, informal networks with the bureaucracy after 
realizing the complexities brought by these changes (Ibid.). 
Defining indigeneity  
A final and fundamental barrier is one of defining indigeneity. As discussed earlier in 
this chapter, significant issues exist in the ways in which indigeneity is defined by the 
international community, and in how it applies to Indonesia. The United Nations Manual 
for National Human Rights Institutions notes that while no formal definition has been 
adopted in international law, it lists factors, developed by the Chairperson-Rapporteur of 
the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, which are important to the understanding 
of indigeneity. These include, among other factors, “priority in time, with respect to the 
occupation and use of a specific territory” (2013, 7). 
While indigenous groups should indeed have rights to their ancestral land, it is 
difficult to decide for which groups and in what situations indigenous status should be 
granted. And definitions of indigeneity among the international community have also 
remained ambiguous, partly in order to retain flexibility, as the situation of indigenous 
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peoples varies widely across different countries. For the Dayaks, though, it is clear that 
frequent mobility leading to competing claims means that the government is indeed in a 
difficult situation in mediating conflicts and making decisions about recognizing 
indigenous status.  
Even within indigenous groups, significant conflict has existed. The case study 
mentioned in Chapter 4, documented by Rhee (2009), in which the Merap and the 
Kenyah labeled their own communities indigenous and labeled the other communities 
newcomers demonstrated the complexities of the situation. While both communities are 
indeed indigenous to Kalimantan, indigeneity to a specific area, or tract of land, also 
becomes important. Because of this, indigenous groups like the Kenyah, who have 
migrated to newer areas for various reasons, find themselves in difficult situations 
wherein they lack strong claims to their new land, yet have left their old land, perhaps 
without the possibility for return.   
Again, the development interests of larger industries must be considered as well. 
Thus, it is not surprising that land conflicts have been so prevalent. Interests of 
indigenous groups, other local communities, and industry must be balanced, and often 
this has led to groups scrambling to compete with one another to file claims (Fujiwara 
2017). At the same time, though, the process by which indigenous claims are recognized 
can also help affirm and strengthen state control over land governance because the state 
then remains the authority on recognizing indigeneity. Some research also has discovered 
that the indigenous groups best connected to local government officials are more likely to 
have their land rights recognized (Van Der Muur 2018, 171). Promoting accountability 
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and transparency by increasingly involving actors external to the decision-making 
process, as well as raising awareness of applications, might help mitigate this issue.  
Regardless, recognizing indigenous groups based on the maintenance of indigenous 
institutions is a reasonable start, and has contributed to growing indigenous movements 
throughout Indonesia. And, the strength of these movements is indeed important in 
promoting indigenous rights. For example, AMAN has repeatedly used its large, 
reportedly 24 million-strong member base to exert pressure on political actors (Nugroho 
2019). The strength of social movements, furthermore, often depends quite heavily on the 
successful creation of a robust collective identity. While it is important to note that the 
Dayaks are indeed a diverse set of indigenous communities, the collective cultural 
identity upon which the Dayak indigenous movement has based itself has been critical to 
community mobilization. As a discussion paper published by the Biodiversity Support 
Program aptly notes, “People move from seeing themselves as weak to seeing themselves 
as resourceful shapers of their own destinies” (2000, 96). Such collective beliefs, further, 
can help weave together a larger polity from often disparate, competing communities.  
NGOs and other organizations also may play an important role in facilitating 
community resilience and utilizing collective cultural identity. With such support, Dayak 
groups could become more able to participate in processes like territory mapping, filing 
land claims, and documenting adat laws, all of which help substantiate claims to 
indigenous identity, and later, customary land ownership. Providing support to grassroots 
organizations or community alliances is one way in which this could be achieved. While 
external NGOs may indeed play a critical role in providing such support, it is further 
important that such external organizations do not compete with grassroots community 
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groups, and instead focus efforts on capacity building. Local empowerment has been a 
critical factor in the establishment and strengthening of the Dayak social movement since 
the fall of Suharto (Alcorn and Royo 2000). 
One important question, though, will be whether indigenous groups that have moved 
from land with which they have historical ties will be granted land elsewhere. Often such 
groups have moved out of necessity. Corporate land-grabbing, for one, has been a 
significant factor that has forced some groups to move to other areas, often creating or 
intensifying land conflicts. Because of this, the scale of indigeneity is important. A group 
might be indigenous to Indonesia as a whole, or to Kalimantan, or to a particular tract of 
land within Kalimantan. Land rights claims based on indigeneity relate directly to this 
issue of scale. For example, if an indigenous West Kalimantese group has been displaced, 
one question is whether or not its customary land claim is legitimate. It depends on scale: 
whether the group’s broader indigeneity to West Kalimantan is enough to qualify it, or if 
its newcomer status on a smaller scale disqualifies it.  
Currently, the answer is ambiguous. The reality is that although the government 
indeed has made significant strides in recognizing customary land as separate from state 
land, the vast majority of Dayak groups, including those who have indeed been classified 
officially as indigenous, have not yet seen their customary land claims realized. Because 
only small areas of land in actuality have been recognized as customary, it is unclear how 
this issue will be addressed. One solution might be to reclassify state land as customary 
land for displaced indigenous groups, despite a lack of historical ties to their new area. 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA), in the United States, takes an approach such that when land is irretrievably 
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polluted, amenities in a new tract of land are adapted to match the amenities of the 
previous tract of land (Environmental Protection Agency n.d.). This model might have 
potential for indigenous groups in Indonesia, in that the government conceivably has an 
obligation to provide land for displaced groups. These groups often have been displaced 
due to state action, such as the sale of extraction permits to logging corporations that 
encroach upon customary land.  
It is important, though, that the quality of this land is considered. As mentioned in 
Chapter 4, this indeed has been an issue in the Village Forest program. Over 20 percent 
of the land that had been granted to local communities for use had already been severely 
degraded, with forest cover of less than 40 percent (Santika et al. 2017, 62).  Another 
concern is the potential for triggering a cascade of degradation, where the movement of 
displaced communities from one tract of land to another might lead to increased forest 
degradation. One argument that has been raised throughout this thesis has been the 
sustainability of indigenous forestry practices. Shifting cultivation, for one, has been 
demonstrated to be quite sustainable, protect greater biodiversity, and has contributed to 
less deforestation than alternative farming practices (Soedjito 2015, 420). It is also 
important, though, that enough territory necessary for shifting cultivation is maintained. 
There must be enough land for fallow periods to be given ample time to regrow before 
they are cultivated again. And, the monitoring functions that indigenous communities 
provide, if they perceive themselves as active stewards of forest resources, could protect 
land from degradation produced by extraction industries and illegal activity like 
poaching.  
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Further, another concern is whether or not indigenous groups should be required to 
maintain their adat institutions after indigenous status has been granted. Even though a 
resurgence in Dayak pride has occurred, some young Dayaks have indicated desire to 
associate themselves with modern lifestyles, and because of this it is possible that the 
preservation of adat institutions could be perceived as a hindrance (Gönner 2017). In 
Thailand, for example, many young, rural Northeasterners seasonally migrate to Central 
Thailand, in part in search of higher income, but also due to a desire to associate 
themselves with the modern, consumerist culture prevalent in cities (Camfield, Masae, 
and Mcgregor 2013). It is therefore conceivable that rural peoples from less populated 
islands in Indonesia may begin to migrate to urban areas. Thus, one issue is that this 
might legitimize the Indonesian government revoking indigenous status and thereby 
customary land rights. An emphasis on ownership rather than access is again important, 
as this would protect indigenous land rights more permanently.  
Summarizing recommendations 
 To summarize, a number of barriers exist for indigenous groups seeking 
recognition of customary land rights. Ambiguity in regulatory procedures has been a 
major barrier, where indigenous communities often have trouble navigating the complex 
and multilevel political and legal systems in Indonesia. A lack of resources also exists 
both for communities and for local governments, wherein a lack of knowledge worsens 
the consequences of these ambiguities. Streamlining processes like permit applications 
and creating manuals targeted at local officials and community members, which in the 
past have been spearheaded by CIFOR, could help mitigate this issue. It is important to 
remember, as well, the unique situation of indigenous peoples in Kalimantan, as adat 
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institutions and practices must be respected. Recall that the maintenance of these 
institutions is a necessary requisite for legitimizing claims to customary land.   
In addition, a corrupt political system, where different layers of government often 
compete with one another, is another problem. This has fed into heightened conflict 
between local communities and government officials, particularly where land rights are 
threatened. The government also actively has repressed political dissent, and this issue 
has worsened in recent years. All of these interactions have fed into a general mistrust of 
the government. Increased involvement of community members in political processes 
could help promote openness and transparency, and as a result, could help reduce 
corruption.  
Lastly, conceptions of indigeneity are important. The construction and 
reinforcement of a collective identity has been a key component of encouraging the 
maintenance of Dayak adat institutions and the strengthening of the Dayak social 
movement. Such collective identities are fundamental to political movements 
internationally, and NGOs often have the capacity to aid in facilitating this. This indeed 
has been the strategy of AMAN, as an indigenous interest group, which as a result has 
been able to exert political pressure through its large voter based. Due to discontent with 
both candidates running in the 2019 Indonesian presidential election, AMAN participated 
in a growing social media movement, “#SayaGolput”, translating, roughly, to abstaining, 
or casting a blank vote. As stated previously, many indigenous groups have been 
frustrated with President Jokowi’s failure to meet previously made promises on 
improving Indonesia’s human rights record (Nugroho 2019). 
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Regardless, the resurgence in Dayak pride in large part has been a welcome 
consequence of decentralization, as indigenous communities and their role in local 
governance has been realized. And, this resurgence has helped strengthen the indigenous 
movement throughout Indonesia, which has been met with some success in the 
government’s recognition of customary land rights claims. Significant progress must still 
be made, however, in securing customary land rights. It is important to note that while the 
government in many cases has granted access, through programs like the Village Forest 
program, and many improvements to such programs could indeed be made, the 
government has done little to grant ownership. And, this ownership would protect 
indigenous land permanently, increase community involvement and self-perceptions as 
active agents in forestry, and in doing so, aid in both security of indigenous livelihoods 
and protecting biodiversity in Indonesia’s forests.   
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